Consumer Returns in Retailing by Ertekin, Necati
CONSUMER RETURNS IN RETAILING
A Dissertation
by
NECATI ERTEKIN
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Michael Ketzenberg
Committee Members, Chelliah Sriskandarajah
Gregory R. Heim
Haipeng “Allan” Chen
Head of Department, Richard D. Metters
May 2016
Major Subject: Information & Operations Management
Copyright 2016 Necati Ertekin
ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I develop econometric and optimization models to help retailers
better manage their consumer returns. I shed light on some prevalent industry practices
and beliefs relevant to consumer returns management and provide managerial implications
while filling some of the existing gaps in the literature of consumer returns. In the first
essay, I examine the association between in-store customer shopping experience during a
purchase and subsequent return and repurchase behavior. Using over 21 million purchase
and return transactions and nearly 75,000 customer satisfaction survey responses from a
national jewelry retailer, I conduct a detailed analysis that incorporates a sample selection
model with simultaneous recursive equation models. Return rates across stores within the
same company can vary significantly. In the first part of this essay, I empirically examine
this variation with respect to product quality, service quality, and customer satisfaction.
The analysis reveals surprising findings for retailers. For instance, I demonstrate that retail
efforts such as increasing salesperson competence and improving store environment, so long
believed to reduce returns, may actually be associated with increased returns. I also show
that service quality during a purchase can be more important than product quality in return
prevention. In the second part of this essay, I provide empirical evidence that a return event
can moderate the satisfaction-repurchase behavior link. More importantly, I show that that
a return event may enable a retailer to regain a dissatisfied customer who would otherwise
be lost.
In the second essay, motivated by common practice, I study the retail strategy of selling
open-box returns side-by-side with new products. I develop a model to assess the impact of
cannibalization due to open-box product sales on profitability and to identify the conditions
in which selling them is preferred to simply salvaging them through liquidators. The opera-
tional decisions are the order quantity, the refund amount, and the open-box product price.
The model captures important market characteristics that include consumer choice between
ii
new and open-box products, uncertainty and heterogeneity in consumer valuation for both
products, and customer sensitivity to a retailer’s return policy. I find that, even if open-box
products cannibalize new demand, selling returns as open-box is always more profitable than
simply salvaging them so long as there is demand for open-box products. Furthermore, re-
tailers may increase their market share by selling open-box products if customer sensitivity
to a retailer’s return policy is low. If it is high, retailers should use a generous policy while
charging premium prices. I also demonstrate that higher return rates do not necessarily lead
to a decrease in profit.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The 2013 National Retailer Federation Annual Returns Survey report indicates that to-
tal merchandise returns account for almost $270 billion in lost sales for U.S. retailers. To
emphasize the overwhelming size of returns, the report makes the analogy that “if merchan-
dise returns were a company it would rank #3 on the Fortune 500” (NRF, 2013). What do
we know about consumer returns? We know that returns have been growing consistently,
if not inordinately, with an overall increase of 41.5% since 2007 (NRF, 2007, 2013). We
also know that they are costly for companies. On average, returns reduce manufacturers’
and retailers’ profits by 4% to 6% (Richardson, 2004; Douthit et al., 2011) and force them
to incur additional operational costs such as shipping and handling that may amount to as
much as $14 billion (Lawton, 2008).
Consumer returns are not new. Indeed, they have been an endemic part of business
since Montgomery Ward & Co., the world’s first mail-order retail company, adopted the
innovative and unprecedented policy of “satisfaction guaranteed or your money back” in
1875 (Brennan, 1991). In a survey of supply chain managers, 87% respond that they are
aware of the importance of consumer returns and agree that managing returns effectively is
important to achieve operational and financial success (Aberdeen, 2009 (accessed February
13, 2014). How do companies manage returns effectively? For that matter, what does
managing returns effectively really mean?
Some retailers are moving toward stricter return policies including a shorter time pe-
riod to return or applying a restocking fee in an effort to reduce returns and recoup costs
associated with them (Bower and Maxham, 2012; Janakiraman and Ordonez, 2012). Some
retailers are trying to prevent returns before they occur by providing a better customer sales
experience during and after a purchase (Meyer, 1999; Stock et al., 2006). Others are trying
to increase the value they obtain from returns by reselling them along with new products
(Consumer-Reports, 2008 (accessed Jun 27, 2014).
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Despite the size and importance of returns, research remains limited. For instance,
we do know from the literature that return rates vary across industries and firms (Rogers
and Tibben-Lembke, 1998) largely due to differences in product categories, return policies,
and customer bases. Such variation can also be present in a single company across multiple
stores. But why? What are the attributes that drive these varying behaviors? The literature
assumes that retailers may prevent returns by improving the customer sales experience,
driving more informed purchases, and providing better post-sale support (Douthit et al.,
2011; Ofek et al., 2011). Unfortunately, there are no studies that address the efficacy of these
prescriptions. While practitioners mainly focus on return prevention (Anonymous, 2015
(accessed Apr 01, 2015), there is anecdotal evidence in the literature that suggests returns
might be another opportunity to enhance customer relationships (Petersen and Kumar,
2009; Griffis et al., 2012). Should retailers prevent returns or leverage them to build a better
customer relationship? Even if returns enable retailers to enhance customer relationships
for future business, does that mean that retailers do not need to worry about the disposition
of returns? Are there smart ways to dispose of returns that will increase the value obtained
from them?
The questions that motivate this dissertation address some prevalent industry practices
and beliefs with respect to effective returns management. In this dissertation, I use a holistic
approach to shed light on these and similar questions. I believe that effective returns man-
agement is encapsulated within a continuum that spans multiple operations and customer
services from the initial design of a product to the disposition of a returned product. In par-
ticular, effective returns management should include (1) designing and manufacturing high
quality products that have easy setup and installation for customers, (2) delivering high qual-
ity service at the point of purchase to ensure the right match with customer preferences, (3)
providing after-sale customer support when needed, (4) offering a return policy that reduces
the risk of mismatch for legitimate customers while minimizing costs due to opportunistic
customers, (5) facilitating returns to ensure customer satisfaction and leveraging them to
enhance customer relationships, and (6) disposing returns efficiently. From this perspective,
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this dissertation focuses on (1) the in-store shopping experience during a purchase, (2) mon-
itoring and influencing customer satisfaction during a return process, and (3) effective and
efficient disposition methods for returned products. This dissertation provides managerial
insights while filling some of the existing gaps in the literature on consumer returns. In
particular, it comprises two essays in which I develop econometric and optimization models
to help retailers better manage consumer returns.
In the first essay, I study returns at a national jewelry retailer, hereafter called Diamond.
I examine the association between in-store customer shopping experience during a purchase
and subsequent return and repurchase behavior. Using over 21 million purchase and re-
turn transactions and nearly 75,000 customer satisfaction survey responses from Diamond,
I conduct a detailed analysis that incorporates a sample selection model with simultaneous
recursive equation models. I demonstrate that return rates across stores within the same
company can vary significantly. In the first part of this essay, I empirically examine this
variation with respect to product quality, service quality, and customer satisfaction. The
analysis reveals surprising findings for retailers. For instance, I demonstrate that retail
efforts such as increasing salesperson competence and improving store environment, so long-
believed to reduce returns, may actually increase returns. I also show that service quality
during a purchase can be more important than product quality in return prevention. In the
second part of this essay, I provide empirical evidence that a return event can moderate the
satisfaction-repurchase behavior link. More importantly, I show that a return event may
enable a retailer to regain a dissatisfied customer who would otherwise be lost.
The first essay provides several useful managerial insights pertaining to return prevention
and returns processing and is likely to help managers to reduce returns. Even so, retailers will
always have to handle returns as long as they allow them. As such, retailers need to effectively
and efficiently manage their disposition. There are a variety of methods including sending
returned products back to the manufacturer for credit, selling them to third party liquidators
at a deep discount, and selling them side-by-side with their new products at a discounted
price. Interestingly, selling side-by-side with new products has not garnered much attention
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from researchers. Even though this strategy is common in practice, it remains unclear how
such a retail strategy should be tactically implemented. The second essay addresses this gap
in the literature.
In the second essay, I develop a model to assess the impact of cannibalization due to
open-box product sales on profitability and to identify the conditions in which selling them
side-by-side with new products is preferred to simply salvaging them through liquidators.
The model captures important market characteristics that include consumer choice between
new and open-box products, uncertainty and heterogeneity in consumer valuation for both
products, and customer sensitivity to a retailer’s return policy. I determine several opera-
tional decisions including the order quantity, the refund amount, and the open-box product
price since these are the key levers that affect a firm’s ability to operationally match sup-
ply with demand. I find that, even if open-box products cannibalize new demand, selling
returns as open-box is always more profitable than simply salvaging them so long as there
is demand for open-box products. Furthermore, retailers may increase their market share
by selling open-box products if customer sensitivity to a retailer’s return policy is low. If
it is high, retailers should use a generous policy while charging premium prices. I also
demonstrate that higher return rates do not necessarily lead to a decrease in profit.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I introduce the first
study that identifies the key drivers of returns and assesses the impact of a return event
on customer relationship. This is followed by the second essay in Chapter 3 in which, I
introduce a return policy for a retailer that resells returned products at a discounted price.
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes my dissertation with a discussion about the contribution of this
dissertation to the academic literature and to practice.
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IN-STORE SHOPPING EXPERIENCE,
CONSUMER RETURNS, AND REPURCHASE BEHAVIOR? AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY
2.1 Introduction
The annual value of consumer returns in the U.S. reached $284 billion in 2014, an increase
of 50.3% since 2007 (NRF, 2007, 2014). For managers, it is not just problematic that returns
are significant and increasing, but that they are costly too. Product returns can reduce profits
on average by 5% to 6% for manufacturers (Douthit et al., 2011) and by 4% for retailers
(Richardson, 2004). Clearly, effective management of returns provides an opportunity to
increase supplier and retailer profitability.
Many factors drive product returns including defects, trade-ins, end-of-life returns, oppor-
tunism, and fraud. Other significant reasons include buyer’s remorse and product mismatch
with customer preference. I focus on the association between in-store customer experience
and subsequent returns, which may be a consequence of buyer’s remorse or a mismatch.
These types of returns account for a large portion of all returns. For example, they are 80%
of all returns in HP’s inkjet printer group (Ferguson et al., 2006) and 95% of all returns
across all consumer electronics (Douthit et al., 2011). In comparison, note that only 5% of
all consumer returns were reported to be truly defective (Lawton, 2008).
The types of returns I study arise due to product valuation uncertainty (Su, 2009).
Prior to a purchase, customers have an expectation about the value of a product. Once
a product is used and experienced, customers are able to realize their perceived valuation.
If the perceived valuation is substantially less than the expected valuation, perhaps due to
poor quality or a mismatch in taste, customers may be dissatisfied (Kotler, 1991). Retailers
offer return policies to insure customers against the risk of potential dissatisfaction. While
lenient return policies are likely to increase sales (Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk, 2009; Akcay
et al., 2013), they will also generate costly returns.
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Given the significance of returns, companies often invest substantially to manage returns
effectively. Yet, firms generally do so reactively, after returns occur (Aberdeen, 2009 (ac-
cessed February 13, 2014). The main focus of reactive approaches is on how best to handle
and dispose of the returns once they arise. In contrast, as suggested by a consumer elec-
tronics industry report by Accenture (Douthit et al., 2011), I believe that effective returns
management should also involve proactive approaches to monitor and influence customer
satisfaction at the point of purchase and to set appropriate expectations. Proactive ap-
proaches to ensure satisfaction and product match during a purchase event should prevent
returns from occurring. Indeed, managers today are actively interested in return preven-
tion. An annual “Consumer Returns” conference for retailers highlights the importance of
several proactive approaches to improve the customer sales experience (Anonymous, 2015
(accessed Apr 01, 2015). Such approaches may include both product and service aspects of
the sales experience. On the product side, thought leaders recommend offering high quality
products, increasing product variety, and improving product displays. On the service side,
recommended tactics include hiring qualified salespeople, training employees, driving more
informed purchases, and changing the store environment (Douthit et al., 2011). A few stud-
ies assume certain tactics work and develop analytical models to address returns within the
context of supply chain issues including coordination between a manufacturer and a retailer
(Ferguson et al., 2006) and store assistance levels for dual channel retailers (Ofek et al.,
2011). However, I am not aware of any empirical study that addresses the efficacy of return
prevention factors. It is not clear how much, if any, each of the suggested practices influences
returns.
Clearly, proactive approaches to manage returns can be irrelevant for some products,
particularly for repeated purchases of products for which customers are already familiar.
Considering that products can be categorized as convenience goods (e.g. groceries, office
supplies, personal care), shopping goods (e.g. apparel, sunglasses, jewelry), and specialty
goods (e.g. computers, digital cameras, video fame consoles) (Thirumalai and Sinha, 2005),
returns due to product mismatch will most likely occur in shopping and specialty goods
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due to the lack of familiarity. In this research, I study the return behavior for high fashion
products that are examples of shopping goods. Specifically, I study jewelry purchases and
returns at a national jewelry retailer, hereafter called Diamond. Since a significant amount of
jewelry purchases are gifts, providing customer service to identify the gift recipient’s taste is
extremely important for Diamond. Indeed, returns due to product mismatch with customer
preference constitute 81% of all returns at Diamond. With average returns of approximately
18% of sales, jewelry returns are significant and most returned items are in perfect working
condition, also known as “good as new” in the literature (Mostard and Teunter, 2006).
What is remarkable and equally stunning to Diamond management is the substantial
variation in return rates across stores. Figure 2.1(a) indicates the annual return rate as a
percentage of USD revenue for 1,167 Diamond stores in 2012, ordered from lowest to highest
and ranging from 7% to 47%. Prior literature draws attention to varying return rates across
industries (Rogers and Tibben-Lembke, 1998), demonstrating sector-specific return rates
from 4% to 35% (Douthit et al., 2011; Rogers and Tibben-Lembke, 1998) and proposing the
variance arises from differences in product categories, return policies, and customer bases.
Yet, no study explain why return rates can vary significantly across stores within the same
company, wherein differences in products, return policies, and customer bases do not exist.
I contribute by examining potential explanations for this variation.
Clearly, other factors drive the level and variation in returns across stores. One potential
explanation is store labor. Figure 2.1(b) demonstrates annual return rates as a percentage
of USD sales for 9,120 salespeople in all stores during 2012, again ordered from lowest to
highest and ranging from 4% to 54%. This picture demonstrates wide variation in individ-
ual salesperson return rates. The skills and effectiveness of salespeople vary and so do their
individual return rates. Intuitively, one may expect that salespeople who are better able to
satisfy customer needs should demonstrate lower return rates. Further, with a single corpo-
rate delivery policy, one might expect the quality of the sales force to be distributed fairly
evenly throughout the company’s stores. Yet, when I take a further look at return rates
of salespeople grouped within stores (Figure 2.1(c)), I observe that low (high) performing
7
Figure 2.1: Diamond 2012 annual return rates by stores and by salespeople
stores have low (high) performing salespeople (the right (left) side of Figure 2.1(c)), indi-
cating a store effect. Return rates obviously vary substantially by store indicating a store
effect. Stores with low return rates must have different practices or better store execution
than stores with high return rates. Identifying these practices and implementing them across
stores may provide significant opportunities for retailers. Consider that even a 1% reduction
in the company-wide average return rate corresponds to a $17 million increase in net sales
at Diamond. For the entire U.S. retailing sector, a 1% reduction in the average consumer
return rate promises $31.9 billion in savings (NRF, 2014). But, what are the return preven-
tion practices that would generate such savings? What can store managers do to reduce or
otherwise manage returns? Answering these questions is the principle motivation for this
study.
I aim to explain the variation in return rates with respect to product quality and service
quality at the point of purchase. I do so because these factors have been shown to have a
clear influence on customer satisfaction. I also believe proactively managing customer sat-
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isfaction at the point of purchase will enable managers to manage returns more effectively.
Empirical studies in marketing and closed-loop supply chain literature state that returns can
be influenced by price (Anderson et al., 2006), lenient or restricted return policies (Petersen
and Kumar, 2009), information provided regarding alternative products before or after a
purchase (Bechwati and Siegal, 2005), and online retailer technology (De et al., 2013). How-
ever, I am not aware of any empirical research that addresses customer satisfaction, service
quality, and product quality as the potential drivers of returns. I contribute by examining
the association between in-store customer experience and subsequent return behavior.
Customer return behavior within the context of satisfaction naturally leads to another
interesting question. How does a return event moderate the link between satisfaction and
repurchase behavior? Repurchase behavior refers to a customer’s total future spending and is
a strong indication of customer loyalty. Many studies report a positive relationship between
customer satisfaction and repurchase behavior (Cooil et al., 2007; Oliver, 2009). However,
some studies empirically show that improving customer satisfaction does not always result in
an increase in repurchase behavior under certain conditions (Van Doorn and Verhoef, 2008;
Voss et al., 2010). I look at this relationship from a consumer returns perspective. Customers
perceive a return policy as part of the service package a retailer provides (LoyaltyOne, 2015
(accessed Mar 09, 2015). Once customers return their products, they will better understand
the value offered by a retailer’s entire service package. As such, return events provide retailers
an opportunity to enhance customer satisfaction and subsequent repurchase behavior since
they represent another service point that is valued by customers. Recent consumer surveys
suggest customers shop more often at a store if they experience a positive return event
(Voxware, 2013 (accessed Mar 09, 2015; LoyaltyOne, 2015 (accessed Mar 09, 2015). In the
academic literature, a few papers examine the impact of returns on repurchase behavior for
online retailers (Petersen and Kumar, 2009; Griffis et al., 2012). However, I am not aware
of any empirical research that explains how repurchase behavior varies with satisfaction
for customers who later experience a return, relative to those who do not return at all in
physical stores. I contribute by examining the moderating role of return events in affecting
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the relationship between customer satisfaction and repurchase behavior in physical stores.
To answer the research questions, I perform a comprehensive analysis using a unique
data set from Diamond. The data consist of around 21 million item-level transactions (of
which 19 million are purchase transactions and 2.1 million are return transactions) over a
four-year period and around 75,000 customer satisfaction survey responses completed after
a purchase event. The data covers every retail outlet of Diamond including over 1,000
stores operating in the U.S. and Canada. Today, regardless of the sector, many major
retailers collect similar transaction data and survey data. Therefore, this study contributes
managerially by illustrating how managers may make use of such data in their analytics
programs.
The data tie customer perceptions recorded within customer surveys to the actual return
and repurchase behaviors that are recorded in the transaction data. By using this data, I
can overcome some of the typical limitations of research based solely on survey data. For
example, consumer returns studies that use perceptions measure either return intentions in
lab studies with students (Bechwati and Siegal, 2005) or repurchase intentions following a
return event through customer surveys (Mollenkopf et al., 2007a). However, these studies
lack the ability to represent real market conditions as there is a gap between intentions and
actual behavior (Souza, 2013). Similarly, literature that uses only transaction data (e.g.
Petersen and Kumar (2009); Griffis et al. (2012)) does not triangulate actual behaviors with
customer perceptions regarding a purchase event, and therefore lacks the ability to explain
the antecedents of the actual behaviors.
Studies often restrict analysis to only transactions that have corresponding surveys. Such
an empirical approach will underutilize data and potentially result in a sample selection
problem. To utilize the Diamond data to the maximum extent and to address sample
selection, I adapt methodology from the econometrics literature. I use a full information
maximum likelihood (FIML) approach to estimate a treatment-effect model.
Overall, I find that retailers can prevent returns from occurring by influencing customer
satisfaction during a purchase event through ensuring high service quality and product qual-
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ity. I demonstrate that service quality may have even greater influence than product quality
on return prevention. I summarize the findings as follows: First, in contrast to the com-
mon belief in consumer returns literature that competent salespeople should reduce returns
(Ferguson et al., 2006; Ofek et al., 2011), I find that high salesperson competence may be
associated with increased returns. This may arise if the information provided by a sales-
person unnecessarily increases customer expectations. Second, I show that a pleasant store
environment may be associated with increased returns. This also may arise due to setting
customer expectations too high since, after a purchase, products do not look or function the
way that they do in the store. Third, when customers perceive a product’s quality as low,
they are more likely to return the product even if the actual quality may not be low.
With respect to the analysis on repurchase behavior, I find that, on average, a return
event increases a customer’s future purchases by $171 per customer per year. More impor-
tantly, the findings suggest that a return event may enable a retailer to regain a dissatisfied
customer who would otherwise be lost. I find that the repurchase amount of customers who
do not return the products they purchase after a dissatisfactory experience is only $6. This
implies that dissatisfied customers who do not return their initial purchases do not shop with
a retail store anymore. Yet, I demonstrate that when these customers return their products,
the average repurchase amount increases up to $154.
I organize the rest of this chapter as follows: In §2.2, I review the relevant literature. In
§2.3, I introduce the models and develop hypotheses. In §2.4, I introduce the data set and
provide explanations for variables. In §2.5, I explain the methodology. I present the model
results in §2.6. Finally, I interpret the findings and conclude the paper in §2.7.
2.2 Prior Literature
This research falls within the product returns literature. This literature is developing
in the fields of marketing and closed-loop supply chain management. Even though there
have been calls in the literature for empirical research to understand the behavioral nature
of product returns (Atasu et al., 2008a), there are still few contributions. The empirical
literature on product returns can be categorized into two streams: drivers of return behavior
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and customer loyalty with a return experience.
The literature on drivers of return behavior aims to explain factors that give rise to
returns. From an assortment perspective, returns tend to occur around a small group of
products among all product categories (Rabinovich et al., 2011). However, specific product
attributes can be associated with high returns. Hess and Mayhew (1997) and Anderson et al.
(2006) observe that consumers are less likely to return lower priced-items. Anderson et al.
(2006) also find empirical support for the impact of size and color variety of products on
apparel returns. In particular, they show that the number of sizes available is positively as-
sociated with returns, whereas increasing color variety is negatively associated with returns.
This implies that size variety increases uncertainty whereas color variety leads to a better
match.
In e-commerce, customers may not be able to truly evaluate product attributes until
they physically receive products. Therefore, providing more information about product fit
using e-commerce technology is important. De et al. (2013) show that zoom technology
used to enlarge picture of an online product is associated with fewer returns. Alternative
photo technology, which shows the product from different views, is also associated with more
returns. The authors argue that zoom technology helps to generate expectations close to
the true attributes whereas the alternative photo technology leads to too high expectations
about the true attributes.
A few papers explain return behavior due to factors such as information availability
and shopping characteristics. Bechwati and Siegal (2005) study how consumers’ pre-choice
thoughts affect the likelihood to return products. They show that when alternative product
information (e.g. information about an updated product version or a competitor product
having more features) is given to the buyer after a purchase, the likelihood of return is
higher than when that information is offered pre-purchase. Petersen and Kumar (2009)
demonstrate customers are less likely to return gifts, discounted products, and products
purchased in a new sales channel, but more likely to return products purchased during a
holiday or purchased from a new category. All studies in this stream highlight important
12
drivers for consumer returns. I contribute to this stream by explaining variation in return
rates across stores and salespeople. In particular, I demonstrate how customer satisfaction,
service quality, and product quality drive consumer return behavior.
The literature on customer repurchase behavior in the context of returns is limited.
In fact, I am aware of only three studies. Among them, Griffis et al. (2012) show that
customers who return items tend to purchase more than those who have never returned.
Petersen and Kumar (2009) demonstrate that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship
between the amount of products a customer returns and repurchase behavior. Therefore,
the amount of returns is positively associated with future customer repurchases up to a
threshold level. Bower and Maxham (2012) study the impact of the cost of returns on
customer repurchase behavior, showing free returns increase repurchase behavior whereas
fee-based returns decrease repurchase behavior. While papers in this stream demonstrate
that, in general, a return experience increases customer repurchase, it is not clear whether
this finding holds for customers with different satisfaction levels. I contribute to this stream
by studying how a return experience moderates the relationship between satisfaction and
repurchase behavior.
2.3 Model and Hypotheses Development
I use two models to examine the research questions. The first model focuses on the
impact of product quality, service quality, and satisfaction during a purchase event on return
behavior. The second model addresses the moderating effect of a return experience on the
relationship between customer satisfaction and repurchase behavior.
2.3.1 Key Drivers of Return Behavior at the Point of Purchase
As shown in Figure 2.2, the first structural model proposes that three variables influence
customer’s return behavior: product quality, service quality, and customer satisfaction. I
discuss the relationship between customer satisfaction and return behavior and then intro-
duce the two quality dimensions as determinants of both customer satisfaction and return
behavior.
13
Figure 2.2: Key drivers of returns during a purchase event
2.3.1.1 Customer Satisfaction
In its simplest form, customer satisfaction is characterized as a function of postpur-
chase perceived valuation (PV) of product quality given prepurchase expected valuation
(EV)(Kotler, 1991). When a customer’s perceived valuation exceeds his/her expectations
(PV≥EV) (falls short of - PV<EV), then the customer is satisfied (dissatisfied) (Anderson
and Sullivan, 1993).
Assuming valuation can be monetized in the form of willingness-to-pay, the underlying
explanation of satisfaction corresponds analogously to that of product returns. Returns
occur when a customer’s perceived valuation is less than the product price (PV<Price).
Moreover, assuming that the salvage value of a returned product is less than its price,
retailers set optimal product price to be equal to the expected valuation (Price=EV) since
(1) customers will not purchase the product at any price above the expected valuation and
(2) retailers lose out on potential revenue for any price they set below the expected valuation
(e.g. Che (1996); Su (2009); Akcay et al. (2013)). Therefore, returning a product can be
an outcome of a customer’s dissatisfaction with that product (Engel et al., 1995; De et al.,
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2013). Hence, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Customer satisfaction is negatively associated with returns.
Research indicates that perceived valuation can be influenced by pre-purchase expecta-
tions (Anderson, 1973; Anderson and Sullivan, 1993). In assessing satisfaction with regard
to a purchase, customers are likely to consider product features and service features (e.g.
empathy, knowledge, and helpfulness of a salesperson) (Parasuraman et al., 1994). There-
fore, I will look at two different factors that are likely to influence a customer’s perceived
valuation: product quality and service quality.
2.3.1.2 Product Quality
Product quality is defined as a customer’s appraisal of a product’s overall excellence or
superiority (Zeithaml, 1988). Many companies consider product quality as one of the driving
reasons of returns (Mollenkopf et al., 2007b). Holding other factors constant, high quality
products may lead to less frequent returns (Stock et al., 2006; Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra,
2007; Li et al., 2013). Seemingly intuitive, a few modeling papers make this assumption (e.g.
Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra (2007); Li et al. (2013)). However, I am not aware of any
empirical test of this simple relationship. Hence, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Product quality at the point of purchase is negatively associated with
returns.
A theoretical framework between product quality and satisfaction has been acknowledged
by researchers both in the product return literature (Stock et al., 2006; Mukhopadhyay and
Setaputra, 2007; Li et al., 2013) and in the marketing literature (e.g. Churchill and Sur-
prenant (1982); Anderson and Sullivan (1993); Parasuraman et al. (1994); Luo and Bhat-
tacharya (2006)). Researchers have consistently shown that product quality is positively
associated with satisfaction (e.g. Parasuraman et al. (1994); Oliver (1997, 1999); Baker and
Crompton (2000); Devaraj et al. (2001); Olsen (1999); Olsen and Johnson (2003)). I do not
formally hypothesize this link since it is not the focus of this study. However, I include it in
the theoretical model and estimate it in the analysis.
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2.3.1.3 Service Quality
Service quality has been a heavily studied topic over the last 30 years. Service quality is
defined as the degree of discrepancy between customers’ normative expectations for a service
and their perceptions of the service performance (Parasuraman et al., 1985). Service qual-
ity and product quality are systemically different due to the service’s inherent intangibility,
inseparability of production and consumption, heterogeneity, and perishability (Zeithaml
et al., 1990). The foundation of service quality theory lies in the product quality and cus-
tomer satisfaction literature (Brady and Cronin, 2001). Early studies (e.g. Gronroos (1982,
1984); Parasuraman et al. (1985)) conceptualize service quality based on the disconfirmation
paradigm. This paradigm suggests that quality results from a comparison of perceived with
expected performance.
Following the disconfirmation paradigm, Parasuraman et al. (1985) identify ten determi-
nants of service quality. Subsequently, Parasuraman et al. (1988) develop the SERVQUAL
model which recasts the ten determinants into five specific dimensions: reliability, respon-
siveness, assurance, empathy, and tangibility. Although SERVQUAL instruments have been
widely used in many different contexts, several authors have identified potential difficulties
with the conceptual foundation and empirical operationalization of the scale (e.g. Carman
(1990); Babakus and Mangold (1992); Cronin and Taylor (1992); Teas (1993); Brady and
Cronin (2001)). In particular, critics have questioned whether the five dimensions of the scale
are generically applicable in all service contexts. Subsequently, adaptations and replacements
of SERVQUAL have been suggested for various industry-specific contexts (Carman, 1990).
Retail service quality is the specific context that is relevant to this study. Consistent with
prior retail service quality literature (Dabholkar et al., 1996), the author observed during
multiple Diamond store visits that the detailed product knowledge that salespeople provide
to customers, personality of salespeople (e.g. being helpful and courteous) and physical
aspects of stores (e.g. appearance, layout) are different for each store, and may help to
explain the variation in return rates across stores and salespeople. Moreover, an individual
customer’s perceived valuation can be influenced by the content of communications from
16
salespeople and the context of the store environment (Helson, 1959). Consequently, I address
three determinants of service quality: salesperson competence, salesperson helpfulness, and
store environment.
Swan et al. (1985) define salesperson competence as the use of technical knowledge and
knowledge of customer needs. A customer’s perception of salesperson competence plays a
critical role in the customer’s sales experience and satisfaction (Kennedy et al., 2001; van
Dolen et al., 2002). I conjecture that identifying the right product that matches customers’
needs requires a salesperson to excel in core tasks and to build empathy with customers to
understand their needs. The core tasks of a salesperson include both being knowledgeable
about the products and performing tasks specified in the job description, such as following
standardized selling orientations (Maxham et al., 2008). To build empathy with customers
requires exerting effort towards customers, called extra-role performance (the role of em-
pathy). Such efforts may include getting personally involved with the customer, asking
personal questions, and learning the reason for the purchase. Without complete product
knowledge and empathy, the risk of a mismatch is likely higher. Overall, salesperson com-
petence allows a salesperson to understand what a customer needs and to provide product
information that potentially meets those needs (Beatty et al., 1996). Providing information
about a product may reveal a mismatch before purchase and prevent a subsequent return.
Yet, a high provision of information may also increase the expectation from a product and
increase returns due to diminished postpurchase perceived valuation (Shulman et al., 2015).
Therefore, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Salesperson competence at the point of purchase has a U-shaped
association with returns.
Salesperson helpfulness refers to the interaction of a salesperson with a customer. Sales-
person helpfulness can influence a customer’s perception about the sales experience (Brown
and Lam, 2008). The literature indicates that courteous and friendly employees increase
the interest of customers (Baker et al., 1998). Customer interest, in turn, increases not
just the time spent in the store but also the willingness to communicate with salespeople
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(Donovan and Rossiter, 1982). In addition, when customers are willing to ask questions,
it is important to have available assistance. Sharma and Stafford (2000) demonstrate that
salesperson availability in a discount store has a significant effect on a customer’s buying
intention. Timely assistance may help customers to find the right product. Salesperson
helpfulness may also lead to variety-seeking through exploring the store, which is likely to
increase the probability of finding the right match.
Store environment refers to tangible and intangible aspects of retail store design including
interior, exterior, layout, and point of sale (Puccinelli et al., 2009). Retailers strategically
plan the store environment including comfortable seats, interior colors, lighting, and well-
organized displays and cases to provide a pleasant shopping experience, positively influence
customers’ purchase behaviors, and ensure that customers find the right match. Overall I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Salesperson helpfulness and store environment at the point of
purchase are negatively associated with returns.
The literature has demonstrated that salesperson competence (Maxham et al., 2008),
salesperson helpfulness (Marques et al., 2013), store environment (Becker, 1965; Baker et al.,
2002; Buell and Norton, 2011; Marques et al., 2013), and overall service quality (Taylor and
Baker, 1996; Spreng and Mackoy, 1996; Ladhari, 2009) lead to satisfaction. As with product
quality, I do not formally hypothesize the link between service quality and satisfaction since
it is not the purpose of this study. However, I still include it in the theoretical model.
2.3.2 Moderating Role of Return Experience
I finalize the hypothesis development by discussing the moderating effect of a return expe-
rience on the relationship between customer satisfaction and repurchase behavior (see Figure
2.3). The academic literature consistently draws a conceptual and empirical link between
customer satisfaction and repurchase behavior (Mittal and Kamakura, 2001; Seiders et al.,
2005; Bolton and Bramlett, 2006; Cooil et al., 2007; Oliver, 2009). However, recent studies
argue that satisfaction has no effect on repurchase behavior under certain circumstances.
These studies examine potential moderators for the satisfaction-repurchase behavior rela-
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tionship. The moderators include customer and marketplace characteristics (Seiders et al.,
2005), relationship duration (Cooil et al., 2007), negative critical incidents (Van Doorn and
Verhoef, 2008), and satiation and inertia (Voss et al., 2010). I contribute to this literature by
proposing return experience as a moderator variable for the satisfaction-repurchase behavior
link.
Figure 2.3: Moderating effect of return experience
Return policies are part of the services retailers offer to their customers. As for any
particular service point, a return event also provides an opportunity for retailers to enhance
the customer relationship. During a purchase event, similar to the uncertainty about the
product valuation, customers also have an uncertainty about the return process and return
ease in case they need to return the product later. Customers who experience a hassle-free
return and learn about the return process will not have that uncertainty and should feel
less pressure about a potential product mismatch during future purchases to the extent that
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their trust and loyalty are increased (Griffis et al., 2012).
There are two more potential impacts of a return event on customer repurchase behavior.
First, from a service perspective, any legitimate return can be viewed as a service failure
since return due to a mismatch occurs after “the service of finding the right match” fails
(Mollenkopf et al., 2007a; Griffis et al., 2012). Therefore, a return experience can be viewed
as a service recovery mechanism that can result in increased customer satisfaction and re-
purchase when managed accordingly. Second, the literature on the satisfaction-repurchase
behavior link argues that ongoing customer relationships tend to be characterized by inertia
that causes customers to maintain a certain level of loyalty. When it is the case, negative
incidents may move the customer relationship from business as usual to a more active state
(McCollough et al., 2000; Van Doorn and Verhoef, 2008). Therefore, I conjecture that a suc-
cessful recovery during a negative incident such as product mismatch may lead to increased
repurchase behavior. Collectively, this discussion leads to the final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Post purchase, between the two groups of customers that have the
same level of satisfaction with a purchase, customers who return their purchases repurchase
more than customers who do not return their purchases at all.
2.4 Data and Definition of Variables
Diamond is a fine jewelry retail chain that sells affordable jewelry and gift items. The
annual household income for its target customers is around $50,000-$75,000 and it has a
wide product span including women’s jewelry, bridal, watches, and men’s jewelry. Diamond
operates more than 1,000 stores under a primary brand name and multiple secondary brand
names in the U.S. and Canada as of February 2015. The retailer also sells online. Most of
the retailer’s stores are located in regional shopping centers. Diamond has a 100% money
back guarantee with a no questions asked policy for items returned within 100 days after
purchase.
This study requires detailed transaction level data and customer satisfaction survey data.
Specific non-financial measures such as customer satisfaction constitutes only a single dimen-
sion of customer relationships. Using only this measure to predict future return or customer
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repurchase behavior suffers from an omitted variable problem in an econometric sense (Na-
gar and Rajan, 2005). Therefore, instead of using future return and repurchase intentions, I
use actual return or purchase behaviors obtained from the transaction data.
In particular, the data consists of roughly 21 million transactions and 77,000 survey
responses which are not publicly available. The data from Diamond is provided under
conditions of anonymity and a signed nondisclosure agreement. I spent three months at
the headquarters to observe operations and understand the data. Diamond operates its
stores centrally so that headquarters determine the assortment, prices, payroll, and employee
training. For instance, headquarters assigns one of six assortment plans to stores depending
on their sizes and the type of the mall in which they are located. As is common for most
retailers, store managers have the authority to hire and terminate employees using a planned
payroll budget for the year as a guideline. At Diamond, salespeople work for an hourly base
salary and a percentage commission depending on their sales performance. Similarly, store
managers work for a monthly base salary and get a commission on total sales. Salespeople
and store managers do not receive a commission from the sales of products that are returned
later. Therefore, a return reduces incentives for both store managers and salespeople. I
also obtained real estate data for all stores and customer data to create some of the control
variables. Table 2.1 describes dependent and independent variables used in the study. I now
explain how I operationalize each variable in the model.
2.4.1 Customer Satisfaction Survey Data (CSSD)
Diamond administers pre-designed automated customer surveys online. When customers
get their receipts immediately after a purchase transaction, the link to an online survey is
provided at the bottom of the receipt. I obtained survey data for the 21-month period
between November 2011 and July 2013. The number of surveys constitutes approximately
0.75% of all customer transactions in the same period. Of 77,465 purchases that have a
corresponding survey, 12,889 result in a return, which is roughly a return rate of 16.6%.
The survey consists of 48 questions. However, I focus only on 15 key questions that
are relevant to this study. The list of these questions is provided in Appendix A. All
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Table 2.1: Variable construction
Variable Type Description Source
Dependent Variables
RETURN Observed An item is returned (1) or not (0) Transaction data
REPURCHASE Observed Ln of $ value of all purchases made within a year Transaction data
Independent Variables
SATISFACTION Latent Customer satisfaction measured using 3 questions CSSD
PRODQUAL Latent Product quality measured using 3 questions CSSD
COMPETENCE Latent Salesperson competence measured using 3 questions CSSD
HELPFULNESS Latent Salesperson helpfulness measured using 3 questions CSSD
ENVIRONMENT Latent Store environment measured using 3 questions CSSD
Control Variables
SURVEYRESPONDED Observed A survey was completed (1) or not (0) Transaction data
PASTPURCHASE Observed Ln of $ value of all past (1 year) purchases Transaction data
PASTRETURN Observed Ln of $ value of all past (1 year) returns Transaction data
BASKETVALUE Observed Ln of $ value of a transaction Transaction data
BASKETSIZE Observed The basket size of a transaction Transaction data
HOLIDAY Observed A holiday or special day purchase (1) or not (0) Transaction data
MALLSALESQFT Observed Average daily revenue per square feet in the mall Real estate data
STORESIZE Observed The size of a store in square feet Real estate data
PRIMARYBRAND Observed A store operates under the flag brand (1) or not (0) Real estate data
GENDER Observed 1 for female and 0 for male Customer data
HHINCOME Observed Estimated household income group for a customer Customer data
AGE Observed Age of a customer Customer data
Selection Model
PASTPURCHASE, BASKETVALUE, GENDER, HHINCOME, and AGE as described above
RESIDENCYLENGTH Observed A customer’s length of home residency in years Customer data
CHILD Observed A customer has at least one child (1) or not (0) Customer data
Notes: CSSD: Customer Satisfaction Survey Data
aaaaaaaLatent variables were each measured using 5-point Likert scales. Further detail is in Appendices A and B.
questions are rated using a 5-point Likert scale. I use three questions to measure Product
Quality (PRODQUAL). As suggested in the literature (Dabholkar et al., 1996), product
quality items include both direct quality questions and a product availability question since
Diamond stores operate under different assortment plans. Moreover, limited product se-
lection may increase the likelihood of a mismatch between product quality and customers’
quality expectations (Finn and Kayande, 2004). I measure Salesperson Competence (COM-
PETENCE) using three questions, Salesperson Helpfulness (HELPFULNESS) using three
questions, and Store Environment (ENVIRONMENT) using three questions.
I also note that I measure each quality dimension from a customer’s perspective. There-
fore, any quality dimension I discuss hereafter should be considered as the customer’s per-
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ceived quality, not actual objective quality. Perceived quality is a global assessment and
a higher-level abstraction rather than a specific attribute of a product. Zeithaml (1988)
explains the difference between perceived quality and actual quality.
Similar to literature that uses both satisfaction and loyalty intentions to measure the
overall satisfaction (McKinney et al., 2002), I use three questions to measure Customer Sat-
isfaction (SATISFACTION): satisfaction, repurchase intention, and recommendation (word-
of-mouth) intention. The rationale for this measurement is that these three questions can
be leading indicators of future business performance (Morgan and Rego, 2006). Therefore,
they can be used together to measure overall satisfaction so long as repurchase and rec-
ommendation intentions are not correlated with actual behaviors. The low correlation (i.e.
0.02) between the actual repurchase behavior and repurchase intention in the data provides
support to use the three questions to measure the overall satisfaction.
2.4.2 Transaction Data
Transaction data are available for the 4.5 year period between August 2009 and December
2013. The wide time range allows to observe the actual past and future purchase and return
behavior of customers who participated in the survey. Diamond has a 100-day return policy.
Since the transaction data covers an additional 1.5 years after the last customer satisfaction
survey data were collected, I do not have a censoring problem. I am able to tie each survey
to its corresponding purchase transaction.
I generate the binary variable RETURN for each transaction to indicate whether a pur-
chase resulted in a return (RETURN = 1) or not (RETURN = 0). In line with the literature
(Seiders et al., 2005; Voss et al., 2010; Griffis et al., 2012), I operationalize Customer Re-
purchase Behavior (REPURCHASE) as the $ value of all purchases made within one year
of a purchase transaction. I take the natural log of REPURCHASE to improve distribution
normality. Later in the robustness test, I also define REPURCHASE as the number of items
purchased and the number of purchase visits (i.e. transactions) made within one year of the
purchase event. Moreover, the transaction data allow to identify each customer’s past pur-
chase and return behaviors as control variables. I explain how I operationalize past purchase
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and return behaviors in the next section.
2.4.3 Control Variables
I include a set of control variables to address sample selection, and to capture customer
past purchase and return behavior, customer demographics, store characteristics, and trans-
action characteristics that may potentially influence return and repurchase behaviors. Survey
response (SURVEYRESPONDED) is a binary variable and is denoted as “1” if a customer
responds to the survey and “0” otherwise. As with REPURCHASE, I measure historical
purchase and return behavior of each customer (PASTPURCHASE and PASTRETURN) as
the $ value for all purchases and returns made up to one year prior to the purchase event.
Mall sales square feet (MALLSALESQFT) indicates the average daily revenue per square
feet that a small-sized store (such as jewelry stores) makes in a mall. I use this variable
to control for the quality and the competitive environment of the mall in which a store is
located. Store size (STORESIZE) denotes the total square feet of a store. Primary brand
name (PRIMARYBRAND) indicates whether a store operates under the primary brand
name or not.
I also control for demographics such as household income (HHINCOME), age (AGE),
gender (GENDER), children (CHILD), and approximate length of residency in years (RESI-
DENCYLENGTH) for customers at their current home address. HHINCOME is an ordinal
variable that ranges between 1 (for household income less than $15,000) and 9 (for household
income greater than $125,000). Finally, I control for transaction characteristics including
the total amount of the transaction (BASKETVALUE) since more expensive products are
more likely to be returned (Anderson et al., 2006; Hess and Mayhew, 1997), the basket size
of a transaction (BASKETSIZE), and whether the transaction is completed within 10 days
before a holiday or special day (e.g. Christmas, Mother’s Day) period or not (HOLIDAY).
I provide descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of all variables in Table 2.2. I
also examined the variance inflation factor (VIF) to check for multicollinearity. With the
VIF score mean 1.49 and range between 1.02 and 3.52, well below the rule-of-thumb cut-off
of 10 (Neter et al., 1990), there is no evidence of multicollinearity in this data set.
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2.5 Research Methodology
I conduct a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for latent variables. The results are
displayed in Appendix B. The CFA indicates that (1) the theoretical model fits the data
and (2) the scales are valid and reliable. Therefore, following Nagar and Rajan (2005) and
Siemsen et al. (2009), I use scale averages as latent variable scores in estimating the models.
I next develop the econometric specifications for testing the hypotheses. I first focus on
the binary regression model (1) to identify the key drivers of returns and (2) to test hypothe-
ses H1-H3. Then, I introduce an OLS model for hypothesis H4 to assess the moderation role
of returns upon repurchase behavior. Next, I discuss the treatment effect model to address
the potential sample selection in all models.
2.5.1 Binary Regression Model for Returns
The binary nature of the observed outcome variable for returns (RETURN) necessitates
the use of a binary choice model such as the logit or probit models (Greene, 2012). These
models are a good fit for the utility-choice framework since they model the difference in
utility between two possible actions (return or keep the product) as a linear combination
of observed variables (Xβ) plus a random variable (). Therefore, any estimated coefficient
in these models is interpreted as the impact of a covariate on the utility from returning a
product. Since  is stochastic, these models can only predict the probability of returning a
product over keeping it. I define the model as:
Prob(RETURNi = 1|x) = Φ(β0 + β1SATISFACTIONi + β2PRODQUALi + β3COMPETENCEi (2.1)
+ β4COMPETENCE
2
i + β5HELPFULNESSi + β6ENVIRONMENTi
+ β7SURVEYRESPONDEDi +Tiβc +Wiβt + Ziβs)
SATISFACTIONi = θ0 + θ1PRODQUALi + θ2COMPETENCEi + θ3HELPFULNESSi
+ θ4ENVIRONMENTi + ei
where Φ(·) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function; Ti is a vector
of customer-specific control variables including PASTPURCHASE, PASTRETURN, GEN-
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DER, HHINCOME, and AGE; Wi is a vector of transaction-specific control variables in-
cluding BASKETVALUE, BASKETSIZE, and HOLIDAY; and Zi is a vector of store-specific
control variables including MALLSALESQFT, STORESIZE, and PRIMARYBRAND. The
subscripts c, t, and s on the three beta vectors indicate that βc is a vector of coefficients
related to customer specific control variables, βt, is a vector of coefficients related to transac-
tion specific control variables, and βs is a vector of coefficients related to store specific control
variables. SURVEYRESPONDED is a binary variable for the sample selection model that
I discuss in section 2.5.3.
Note that the latent variable SATISFACTION is a mediator between PRODQUAL,
COMPETENCE, HELPFULNESS, ENVIRONMENT, and RETURN. Therefore, I also
specify the regression equation for SATISFACTION. The key variables to assess H1-H3
are SATISFACTION, PRODQUAL, COMPETENCE, COMPETENCE2, HELPFULNESS,
and ENVIRONMENT in the probit model, respectively.
2.5.2 OLS Model for Repurchase Behavior
Recall that REPURCHASE is a continuous variable. Therefore, I specify the model as
an OLS regression:
REPURCHASEi = α0 + α1SATISFACTIONi + α2RETURNi + α3SATISFACTIONi x RETURNi (2.2)
+ α4SURVEYRESPONDEDi +Tiαc +Wiαt + Ziαs + ξi
SATISFACTIONi = θ0 + θ1PRODQUALi + θ2COMPETENCEi + θ3HELPFULNESSi
+ θ4ENVIRONMENTi + ei
where the interaction term SATISFACTIONi x RETURNi represents the marginal effect
of RETURN to vary with SATISFACTION. As in the binary regression model, I specify the
regression equation for the mediator variable SATISFACTION. The key variable to assess
H4 is the interaction term SATISFACTIONi x RETURNi in Equation 2.2.
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2.5.3 Selection Model
One can argue that customers complete surveys only if they are extremely happy or
extremely angry with the service they get at the point of purchase. Moreover, responding to
a survey is not randomized since customers themselves decide whether or not to complete
the survey. Therefore, customer satisfaction surveys inherently embody self-selection.
Survey-based studies often use early vs. late response comparisons to show that selec-
tion bias is not a concern (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). This approach is based on the
assumption that individuals who respond later can be used as a proxy to non-respondents.
Using transaction data and customer data, I am able to directly compare respondents to
non-respondents as well as early respondents to late respondents. I find that even though in
some cases early respondents and late respondents are not statistically different, customers
who completed the survey have statistically different return and repurchase behaviors from
those who did not complete the survey. Therefore, assuming late respondents represent be-
haviors of non-respondents and such behaviors are identical to early respondents is difficult
to substantiate for this study. When this assumption does not hold, a selection problem
exists. In that case, an empirical model that does not account for sample selection can
generate misleading estimates and conclusions (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983; Ghosh and
John, 2009).
Extant literature has identified multiple methods to address self-selection. The two
most common methods heavily used in the literature are Heckman models (Heckman, 1979)
and the treatment effect model (Greene, 2012). Heckman models are used when (1) the
dependent variable is observed only if selection occurs and (2) the dummy variable that
indicates the selection condition does not appear in the regression equation. The treatment
effect model differs from Heckman models in two aspects. First, the dependent variable is
observed regardless of the selection. Second, the dummy variable indicating the selection
condition is directly entered into the regression equation.
Diamond offers its customers a $100 discount on their next purchases of $300 or more
if they complete the online survey. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that any customer
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who completes the survey is very likely to purchase more items in the future to benefit
from the discount offer. Moreover, the $100 discount may incentivize some customers to
exchange the item they purchase with a more expensive item. As a result, I can expect
that completing the survey might increase both returns and repurchase behavior. Moreover,
using transaction data, I am able to observe SATISFACTION and REPURCHASE variables
for all customers regardless of whether or not they complete the survey. For these reasons,
I use the treatment effect model in this analysis.
Customers have the choice of whether or not to respond to the survey. Customers will re-
spond if they believe the net utility from responding is nonnegative given their idiosyncratic
characteristics. In evaluating the effect of completing the survey on return and repurchase
behavior, it is important to account for truncation in both dependent variables owing to the
self-selection by customers in their survey response choice. The endogenous switching re-
gression model addresses this concern. Specifically, this model is expressed in two equations:
yi = Xiβ + δSURVEYRESPONDEDi + ui (2.3)
SURVEYRESPONDED∗i = Riγ + vi (2.4)
SURVEYRESPONDEDi =

1 if SURVEYRESPONDED∗i > 0
0 otherwise
where yi (δ) in Equation 2.3 corresponds to Prob(RETURNi = 1|x) (β7) and REPURCHASEi
(α4) in Equations 2.1 and 2.2, respectively; SURVEYRESPONDED
∗
i represents the unob-
served benefit from completing the survey; Ri is a vector of independent variables repre-
senting a customer’s idiosyncratic characteristics including PASTPURCHASE, BASKET-
VALUE, GENDER, HHINCOME, AGE, RESIDENCYLENGTH, and CHILD; and vi is the
error term. Although SURVEYRESPONDED∗i is not observed, I can observe the actual de-
cision SURVEYRESPONDEDi of each customer. Assuming vi to be normally distributed,
vi ∼ N(0, σ2), the selection model becomes a probit model. To complete the model speci-
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fication, I assume that the error term pair (ui, vi) has a bivariate normal distribution with
mean 0 and covariance matrix
σ ρ
ρ 1
, where ρ is the correlation between u and v.
Multiple studies in the literature estimate the treatment effect model for different con-
texts when Equation 2.3 is a single regression equation. However, in my case, Equation
2.3 is a set of equations consisting recursive simultaneous equations that include a mediator
variable in all models. I am not aware of any study in the Marketing and Operations Manage-
ment literature that applies the treatment effect model to recursive simultaneous equation
models. I adapt methodology from econometrics literature (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh,
2004) that uses the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach to estimate the
treatment effect model with recursive models. The FIML approach assumes that missing
data to be at least missing at random (MAR) and estimates a likelihood function for each
transaction based on the variables that are present so that all available data are used. I
operationalize this approach by:
• including a dummy latent variable L with two indicators: yi and SURVEYRESPONDEDi,
• constraining the coefficient of the path from L to SURVEYRESPONDEDi to be 1 and,
• constraining the variance of L to be 1.
Let β∗, γ∗, and σ2∗ be the estimated parameters in the model. Now, let κ denote the
coefficient of L in Equation 2.3. Note that due to the increased residual variance in the
selection model, the coefficients in the selection model are expected to increase by a factor of
√
1 + σ2∗ . Therefore, I need to apply the following transformation to obtain the parameters
in the standard probit model:
β = β∗; γ = γ∗/
√
1 + σ2∗ ; σ = σ2
∗
+ κ2; and ρ = κ/
√
(κ2 + σ2∗)(1 + σ2∗) (2.5)
Note that this approach is not restricted to only recursive simultaneous equation models.
The approach can also be applied to other models with observed variables within a single
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regression equation and structural equation models with latent variables. I estimate all
parameters using Stata13 (Stata-Corp., 2014). In all regressions, I use robust standard
errors clustered at the store level to account for nonindependence of observations from the
same store. I next present the findings.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 The Return Model
Recall that the survey data are available for the time period between November 2011
and July 2013. For the same time period, there are 9,248,600 item-level transactions in the
transaction data. I use the rest of the transaction data to create PASTPURCHASE, PAS-
TRETURN, and REPURCHASE variables for every customer. Since the survey data relate
to the transaction level, I also aggregate the item-level transactions into the transaction-
level. Doing so gives 6,086,273 transactions for the survey time period, of which 73,598
transactions have a corresponding survey. Overall, I identify 6,012,675 non-respondents.
For this analysis, I randomly sample 100,000 non-respondents and merge the correspond-
ing data with the 73,598 respondents. This process generates a sample size of 173,598 for
the analysis. I use this data to test H1-H3 on the first (the Probit) model. Later in the
robustness check, I show that different samples and sample sizes do not change the results.
Table 2.3 provides results for the RETURN model. Model-1 is the baseline model that
incorporates only the control variables and the sample selection model. To analyze the
mediating effect of SATISFACTION, I use the causal steps procedure introduced by Baron
and Kenny (1986). This approach involves the comparison of three models: One model in
which the dependent variable is regressed on the independent variables to show direct effect
(Model-2); a second model in which the mediated variable is regressed on the independent
variables (Model-3); and a third model in which the dependent variable is regressed on both
the independent variables and the mediator (Model-4). I test H1-H3 based on the estimated
results on Model-4. Model fit statistics (Wald χ2 and R2) indicate a good fit in all models.
Moving from Model-1 to Model-4 increases model fit significantly (∆χ2(df) = 298(6), p <
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0.001).
Table 2.3: Estimation results for the return model
Model Variables Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4
MEDIATION
Intercept 0.80***(0.016) 0.80***(0.028)
PRODQUAL 0.23***(0.004) 0.23***(0.007)
COMPETENCE 0.10***(0.003) 0.10***(0.005)
HELPFULNESS 0.28***(0.005) 0.28***(0.009)
ENVIRONMENT 0.23***(0.005) 0.23***(0.009)
RETURN
Intercept -0.14***(0.011) 1.42***(0.351) -1.08*aa(0.466)
SATISFACTION -0.09*aa(0.036)
PRODQUAL -0.25***(0.065) -0.46***(0.038)
COMPETENCE -0.32*aa(0.139) -0.50*aa(0.228)
COMPETENCE2 0.05**a(0.018) 0.07**a(0.027)
HELPFULNESS -0.01aaa(0.025) 0.01aaa(0.049)
ENVIRONMENT 0.08**a(0.033) 0.19***(0.046)
CONTROLS
PASTPURCHASE -0.00aaa(0.001) 0.01**a(0.003) 0.00aaa(0.005)
PASTRETURN 0.02***(0.001) 0.04***(0.011) 0.07***(0.008)
GENDER -0.02***(0.003) -0.02aaa(0.042) 0.02aaa(0.025)
HHINCOME -0.00*aa(0.001) -0.00aaa(0.004) -0.01aaa(0.006)
AGE -0.00***(0.000) -0.00***(0.000) -0.00***(0.001)
BASKETVALUE 0.02***(0.001) 0.01aaa(0.038) 0.11***(0.011)
BASKETSIZE 0.02***(0.001) 0.05***(0.010) 0.08***(0.000)
HOLIDAY 0.01*aa(0.003) 0.03†aa(0.015) 0.02aaa(0.024)
MALLSALESQFT 0.03***(0.008) 0.06aaa(0.047) 0.00aaa(0.000)
STORESIZE 0.00aaa(0.003) 0.01aaa(0.017) 0.00aaa(0.000)
PRIMARYBRAND 0.01*aa(0.003) 0.03aaa(0.018) 0.05aaa(0.031)
SURVEYRESPONDED 0.49***(0.007) 0.45***(0.008) 0.25***(0.008)
SELECTION
Intercept -0.93***(0.028) -1.26***(0.038) -1.22***(0.051)
PASTPURCHASE ($) 0.00aaa(0.002) -0.01***(0.002) 0.00aaa(0.002)
BASKETVALUE 0.08***(0.004) 0.11***(0.005) 0.13***(0.007)
GENDER 0.19***(0.009) 0.14***(0.011) 0.31***(0.014)
HHINCOME 0.01***(0.002) 0.01**a(0.003) 0.02***(0.004)
AGE 0.01***(0.000) 0.00***(0.000) 0.08***(0.001)
RESIDENCYLENGTH -0.01***(0.001) -0.01***(0.001) -0.01***(0.001)
CHILD -0.01aaa(0.008) -0.01aaa(0.009) -0.02aaa(0.019)
χ2 (df) 455(12)aaa 748(17)aaa - 753(18)aaa
ρ -0.69***aa -0.81**aaa - -0.82**aaa
R2 - - 0.58aaaaa -
Notes: †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
aaaaaaaClustered robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
As seen in Model-4, SATISFACTION (β = −0.09, p < 0.05) is negatively associated with
returns, providing support for H1. This finding suggests that managers may prevent returns
by monitoring and influencing customer satisfaction at the point of purchase. I also find
that PRODQUAL (β = −0.46, p < 0.001) is negatively associated with returns, providing
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support for H2. As I expect, a product with high quality perceived by a customer is less
likely to be returned.
I note that both linear and quadratic terms for COMPETENCE are significant, but the
coefficient is positive for the linear term (β = −0.50, p < 0.05) and negative for the quadratic
term (β = 0.07, p < 0.01). Although this is necessary to claim a U-shaped relationship
between COMPETENCE and RETURN, it is not sufficient. To support this relationship, I
perform further analysis using the Box-Whisker plot of the data (Gokpinar et al., 2010) and
the marginal effect of COMPETENCE (Siemsen et al., 2009). Note that Probit coefficients
represent a change in the linear z-score predictor as a result of a change in an independent
variable. Different coefficient signs of linear and quadratic terms of COMPETENCE make
it difficult to draw a conclusion about the overall effect of COMPETENCE on returns.
Therefore, I estimate predicted values for return probability and mean marginal effects to
understand the overall effect of COMPETENCE.
Figure 2.4(a) shows the predicted return probabilities at various salesperson competence
levels. The figure demonstrates that on average, an increase from 1 to 2 (2 to 3) in COMPE-
TENCE reduces the probability of a return by 15% (8%). The decrease in the probability of
return due to an increase in COMPETENCE diminishes at the COMPETENCE threshold
value of 3.75. After the threshold, an increase from 4 to 5 in COMPETENCE increases the
probability of a return by 6%. This supports the U-shaped relationship. The Box-Whisker
plots in Figure 2.4(b) provides a simple visualization of the predicted return probabilities at
different levels of COMPETENCE, also supporting the U-shaped relationship. Finally, as
seen in Figure 2.4(c), the marginal effect of COMPETENCE on predicted return probabili-
ties remains negative up the the COMPETENCE threshold value of 4 and becomes positive
after the threshold, indicating a U-relationship. Hence, I conclude that the model supports
the U-shaped relationship between COMPETENCE and RETURN (H3a).
For salesperson helpfulness and store environment, I observe some interesting and coun-
terintuitive results. I find that HELPFULNESS is not significant. I also observe that, even
though significant, the coefficient of ENVIRONMENT (β = 0.19, p < 0.001) is positive. In
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Figure 2.4: Analysis of U-shaped relationship between COMPETENCE and RETURN
contrast to the hypothesis, I see that pleasant store environments appear to increase returns.
Therefore, H3b is not supported.
In the theoretical model, I implicitly hypothesize that SATISFACTION partially medi-
ates the effects of product quality and service quality elements on RETURN. To establish
this hypothesis, the direct effects of product quality and service quality elements (1) on
RETURN (Model-2) should be significant; (2) on SATISFACTION (Model-3) should be
significant; and (3) on RETURN when controlling for SATISFACTION (Model-4) should
be significant. Overall, Models 2 to 4 demonstrate that SATISFACTION partially mediates
the effect of PRODQUAL, COMPETENCE, and ENVIRONMENT.
Among the key controls, I find that PASTRETURN, BASKETVALUE, and BASKET-
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SIZE are positively associated with returns, indicating customers who historically return
more, who purchase more expensive items, and who purchase higher quantities return more.
I also find that sample selection is significant (ρ = −0.82, p < 0.01) in the data and customers
who complete the survey are more likely to return.
2.6.2 The Repurchase Model
To test H4 on the second model (Equation 2.2), I create a different dataset. Note that I
operationalize the REPURCHASE variable based on each customer’s future purchases made
within a year of the original transaction time. Also note that the transaction data are
available up to December 31, 2013, implying that any survey completed between January
2013 and July 2013 does not have a complete one year of associated transaction records to
generate the REPURCHASE variable. Therefore, to avoid censoring problems, I eliminate
all observations with a transaction date between January 2013 and July 2013 in the sample
dataset that I use for the first model. Doing so gives a second dataset with a sample size of
120,312 to estimate the REPURCHASE model.
Table 2.4 provides results for the REPURCHASE model. Model-5 is the baseline model
that incorporates only the control variables and selection model. Similar to what I do in
the RETURN model, I estimate three models to analyze the mediation effect. Model-6
shows the direct effects of independent variables on REPURCHASE. Model-7 is a simple
OLS regression for the mediating variable SATISFACTION. Model-8 is the theoretical model
that I use to assess H4. Model-9 is the full model with all direct effects and the mediating
variable. Note that I include RETURN and SATISFACTIONxRETURN variables in Model-
8 to test the moderating effect of RETURN. Model fit statistics (Wald χ2 and R2) indicate
a good fit in all models. Moving from Model-5 to Model-8 increases model fit significantly
(∆χ2(df) = 1, 532(3), p < 0.001).
Model-8 shows that the main effects SATISFACTION (β = 0.42, p < 0.001) and RE-
TURN (β = 3.59, p < 0.001) are significant. Yet, in contrast to the hypothesis, while
significant, the interaction term SATISFACTIONxRETURN (β = −0.40, p < 0.001) is neg-
atively associated with returns. Therefore, H4 is not supported. To better understand the
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Table 2.4: Estimation results for the repurchase model
Variables Model-5 Model-6 Model-7 Model-8 Model-9
Intercept 0.76***(0.020) 0.76***(0.035) 0.76***(0.035)
PRODQUAL 0.23***(0.005) 0.23***(0.009) 0.23***(0.009)
COMPETENCE 0.10***(0.004) 0.10***(0.006) 0.10***(0.006)
HELPFULNESS 0.28***(0.006) 0.28***(0.011) 0.28***(0.011)
ENVIRONMENT 0.23***(0.006) 0.23***(0.011) 0.23***(0.011)
Intercept 3.39***(0.295) 3.22***(0.437) 1.26**a(0.406) 1.79***(0.447)
SATISFACTION 0.42***(0.055) 0.49***(0.074)
RETURN 3.59***(0.525) 3.52***(0.529)
SATISxRET -0.40***(0.111) -0.39***(0.111)
PRODQUAL -0.13†aa(0.077) -0.07aaa(0.077)
COMPETENCE 0.24***(0.061) 0.16**a(0.060)
HELPFULNESS -0.14aaa(0.097) -0.22*aa(0.097)
ENVIRONMENT 0.13*aa(0.037) -0.04aaa(0.096)
PASTPURCHASE 0.24***(0.008) 0.25***(0.009) 0.24***(0.009) 0.24***(0.009)
PASTRETURN 0.11***(0.014) 0.09***(0.016) 0.06***(0.016) 0.06***(0.016)
GENDER -0.17***(0.050) -0.19***(0.055) -0.28***(0.054) -0.28***(0.054)
HHINCOME -0.02**a(0.011) -0.03**a(0.012) -0.03**a(0.012) -0.03**a(0.012)
AGE -0.01***(0.002) -0.01**a(0.002) -0.01**a(0.002) -0.01**a(0.002)
BASKETVALUE 0.23***(0.021) 0.23***(0.023) 0.20***(0.022) 0.20***(0.022)
BASKETSIZE 0.13***(0.015) 0.13***(0.018) 0.10***(0.016) 0.10***(0.016)
HOLIDAY -0.13**a(0.044) -0.17***(0.049) -0.17***(0.048) -0.17***(0.048)
MALLSALESQFT -0.12aaa(0.167) -0.15aaa(0.168) -0.17aaa(0.000) -0.17aaa(0.000)
STORESIZE 0.00aaa(0.052) 0.02aaa(0.056) 0.00aaa(0.000) 0.00aaa(0.000)
PRIMARYBRAND 0.06aaa(0.053) 0.11†aa(0.059) 0.11†aa(0.058) 0.10†aa(0.057)
SURVEYRESPONDED 0.75***(0.017) 0.79***(0.019) 0.83***(0.021) 0.82***(0.020)
Intercept -1.12***(0.040) -1.23***(0.041) -0.51***(0.028) -0.51***(0.028)
PASTPURCHASE ($) 0.00aaa(0.002) -0.01***(0.002) 0.00**a(0.001) 0.00**a(0.001)
BASKETVALUE 0.11***(0.005) 0.11***(0.005) 0.05***(0.003) 0.05***(0.003)
GENDER 0.20***(0.012) 0.15***(0.013) 0.11***(0.007) 0.11***(0.007)
HHINCOME 0.01**a(0.003) 0.01***(0.004) 0.01***(0.002) 0.01***(0.002)
AGE 0.01***(0.000) 0.00†aa(0.000) 0.00***(0.000) 0.00***(0.000)
RESIDENCYLENGTH -0.00***(0.001) -0.01***(0.001) -0.00***(0.001) -0.00***(0.001)
CHILD -0.00aaa(0.011) -0.00aaa(0.012) -0.00aaa(0.006) -0.00aaa(0.006)
χ2 (df) 1,384(12)aaa 1,598(16)aaa 2,916(15)aaa 2,925(19)aaa
ρ -0.42***aa -0.42***aaa -0.20***aaa -0.21***aaa
R2 0.54aaaaa
Notes: †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
aaaaaaaClustered robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
interaction effect of RETURN on the satisfaction-repurchase behavior link, I provide a cor-
responding conditional effect plot (Aiken et al., 1991) in Figure 2.5. The figure demonstrates
the predicted natural log-transformed REPURCHASE for returners and non-returners with
respect to SATISFACTION. The shaded area around each line indicates the 95% confidence
interval. I find that, when all other variables are held fixed at their means, on average, a
return event results in a $171 increase in customer repurchase behavior. Even though the
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figure implies that the increase in repurchase behavior due to a return event is higher for
dissatisfied customers than for satisfied customers, one should be cautious with the interpre-
tation. When I transform the numbers into $ values, I see that on average, a return event
increases a dissatisfied (SATISFACTION= 1) customer’s repurchase behavior from $6 to
$154. For a satisfied customer (SATISFACTION= 5), a return event increases repurchase
behavior from $31 to $208, implying that the revenue increase due to a return event is higher
for satisfied customers than for dissatisfied customers.
Figure 2.5: The effect of return on customer repurchase behavior
To test the mediation effect, I follow the same procedure as in the RETURN model.
When I consider models 6, 7, and 9 collectively, I find that SATISFACTION completely
mediates the effect of PRODQUAL and ENVIRONMENT on REPURCHASE and partially
mediates the effect of COMPETENCE on REPURCHASE. For the key control variables, I
observe that customers who historically buy and return more (PASTPURCHASE, PASTRE-
TURN), purchase more expensive items (BASKETVALUE), and purchase high quantities
(BASKETSIZE), purchase more in the future. I also find that sample selection is significant
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(ρ = −0.21, p < 0.001) in the data and customers who complete the survey purchases more
in the future than those who do not complete the survey. This, of course, is not surprising
given that survey respondents are offered a discount coupon on future purchases.
2.6.3 Post Hoc Analysis
I conduct the analysis on return and repurchase behaviors to this point without consider-
ation of the time elapsed between an initial purchase and a subsequent return event. Recall
that Diamond has a 100-day return policy. The average time to return (TTR) a product in
the data is three weeks. While there are numerous customers who return the product on the
day they purchase, it is also possible to see a return three months after the original purchase.
The varying TTRs may arise simply due to the fact that customers have different shopping
and return behaviors. Therefore, I conduct a post hoc analysis to assess how return and
repurchase behaviors change for returns that occur at different times.
2.6.3.1 The Return Behavior for Different TTRs
I divide returns in the sample into five groups: returns that occur (1) on the day of
purchase (0-day), (2) between day 1 and day 6, (3) between day 7 and day 15, (4) between
day 16 and day 45, and (5) after 45 days. Each group constitutes approximately 20% of all
returns.
Table 2.5: Estimation results for the return model for different TTR groups
TTR Key Independent Variables
SATISFACTION PRODQUAL COMPETENCE COMPETENCE2 HELPFULNESS
0 0-day -0.09aaa(0.076) 0.10aaa(0.109) -0.39aaa(0.366) 0.07†aa(0.044) 0.05aaa(0.117)
1 1-6 days -0.14*aa(0.058) -0.53***(0.060) -0.44†aa(0.295) 0.07†aa(0.041) -0.03aaa(0.077)
2 7-15 days -0.11*aa(0.049) -0.46***(0.060) -0.52*aa(0.297) 0.07†aa(0.040) 0.07aaa(0.080)
3 16-45 days -0.01aaa(0.056) -0.40***(0.058) 0.03aaa(0.364) -0.00aaa(0.044) -0.08aaa(0.073)
4 >45 days -0.03aaa(0.067) -0.33***(0.066) -0.74*aa(0.314) 0.10*aa(0.047) 0.06aaa(0.085)
ENVIRONMENT
0 0-day -0.31**a(0.105)
1 1-6 days 0.27***(0.081)
2 7-15 days 0.21**a(0.075)
3 16-45 days 0.24***(0.072)
4 >45 days 0.10aaa(0.082)
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I next estimate the RETURN model (Equation 2.1) with TTR grouping. I present the
findings for the key independent variables in Table 2.5. I observe that except for the store
environment, customer purchase experience is not significant to explain return behaviors
of customers who return product on the day of original purchase. In contrast to the find-
ings from the entire dataset, store environment is negatively associated with 0-day returns.
The main findings from the RETURN model are consistent with the findings for customers
who return their purchases between the first two weeks (TTR=1 and 2). I observe that for
TTR=3 (TTR=4), only PRODQUAL and ENVIRONMENT (COMPETENCE) are signif-
icant, indicating that satisfaction with a purchase experience does not influence late return
behaviors.
2.6.3.2 The Impact of TTR on Repurchase
I conduct a similar analysis for the REPURCHASE model (Equation 2.2) to understand
how a return event moderates the satisfaction-repurchase behavior link for different return
times. I find that, although the magnitude of coefficients are slightly different, the findings for
the middle three groups (returns that occur between day 1 and day 45) demonstrate similar
results to the main findings. Therefore, to improve readability, I report the aggregated
findings for the middle three groups along with 0-day returners and late returners (TTR>45
days) in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Estimation results for the repurchase model for different TTR groups
TTR Key Independent Variables
SATISFACTION RETURN SATISxRET
0-day 0.44***(0.051) 1.78aaa(0.879) -0.36aaa(0.366)
1-45 days 0.41***(0.058) 4.10***(0.060) -0.48***(0.124)
>45 0.41***(0.056) 0.97†aa(0.365) 0.23aaa(0.266)
The findings suggest that a return event is not associated with the repurchase behavior
of a customer who returns a product on the day of the purchase (0-day). I observe that
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the results for returns that occur between day 1 and day 45 are consistent with the findings
from the entire dataset. Finally, I observe that while the main effects are significant, the
interaction term is not significant for the last group. I illustrate the findings in Figure 2.6.
The figure demonstrates the repurchase behavior of each returner group and non-returners
with respect to SATISFACTION using predicted margins produced based on only significant
coefficients.
Figure 2.6: The effect of time to return on customer repurchase behavior
2.6.4 Robustness Checks
The results remain robust to several checks on regression model specifications, theoretical
model constructions, sampling schemes, omitted variable issues, and alternative operational-
ization of dependent variables. First, I replicate the analysis using normal standard errors
and robust standard errors and find consistent results. Second, to justify the theoretical
U-shape relationship between COMPETENCE and RETURN in Equation 2.1, I estimate
linear, cubic, and quartic models and compare each to the quadratic model using Akaike
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Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC for
different models indicate that the theoretical quadratic model fits best to data.
Third, I estimate each model 30 times using a different sample of 100,000 non-respondents
along with 73,598 respondents for each time. Fourth, I use different sample sizes for non-
respondents including 50,000, 75,000, 200,000, and 400,000. I find that neither the sample
size nor the sample itself change the findings. Fifth, the rich set of control variables I use in
the analysis mitigates the concerns due to omitted variable bias (Davidson and MacKinnon,
1993).
Finally, I operationalize REPURCHASE in two alternative ways. I define it (1) as the
number of items purchased within a year and (2) as the number of purchase visits (transac-
tions) made within a year. Both constructs necessitate the use of a count regression model
such as Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions (Greene, 2012). The difference between
these two models is the assumption of equality of the conditional mean and variance of the
dependent variable. Even though the summary statistics of these two variables indicate
that a Negative Binomial model would be a better fit due to the lack of the equidisper-
sion assumption, I estimate Equation 2.2 using both Poisson regression model and Negative
Binomial regression model for alternative REPURCHASE constructs. I find that alterna-
tive operationalizations of REPURCHASE do not change the insights, providing additional
support to my framework.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This study contributes to the understanding of consumer return behavior by examining
the association between in-store customer experience during a purchase and a subsequent
return and repurchase behavior. While the extant literature draws attention to varying
return rates across industries due to several sector-specific factors, I show that return rates
across stores within the same company, where sector-specific differences do not exist, can
vary significantly as well. This study is among the first studies to empirically examine
this variation with respect to product quality, service quality, and customer satisfaction. I
also provide empirical evidence that a return event can actually moderate the satisfaction-
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repurchase link. I further identify how a return event can moderate this link differently
for different return times. Using data from a national jewelry retailer, I conduct a detailed
analysis by employing a rigorous empirical approach that incorporates a sample selection
model with simultaneous recursive equation models. The unique and rich data set allows me
to tie customer perceptions about a purchase experience to the actual return and repurchase
behaviors. I now interpret the findings and provide practical managerial insights.
2.7.1 Return Prevention
Considering that managers today are actively seeking return prevention tactics (Douthit
et al., 2011; Anonymous, 2015 (accessed Apr 01, 2015), this study demonstrates managerially
relevant findings for any firm that wants to better manage consumer returns. Theoretically,
I identify satisfaction with a purchase, product quality, and service quality as factors that
influence and help to explain customer return behavior. The findings suggest that satisfaction
during a purchase event reduces returns. Customer satisfaction is an important performance
measure for retail stores as it is related to future sales. The results add additional importance
to customer satisfaction since high customer satisfaction also indicates lower return rates for
stores. Among the key product and service quality elements, I find that product quality
and salesperson competence have more impact on returns than store environment whereas
salesperson helpfulness does not influence returns.
With respect to product quality, I observe that when customers perceive high product
quality, they are less likely to return an item. While many papers discuss that increased
product quality should reduce consumer returns, this study is the first that empirically
demonstrates this relationship. One way to ensure high perceived product quality is to
include high quality products in a firm’s product assortment. By doing so, one would expect
that when all stores within a company carry very similar assortments, as is the case in
Diamond, the product quality should not contribute to the variation in returns across stores.
Yet, surprisingly, I observe that a customer’s perception about product quality contributes
significantly to the variation in returns. This indicates that, in addition to offering high
quality products, what is equally likely to ensure highly perceived product quality is making
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customers aware of the actual quality of products. Otherwise, firms who offer high quality
products with the belief that returns due to quality should be low can still face high returns.
With respect to service quality, I show that high salesperson competence might be as-
sociated with decreased returns up to a threshold. After the threshold, an increase in a
customer’s perception about the competence may increases returns (i.e. U-shaped relation-
ship). While the first effect of salesperson competence is expected, the latter impact is
counterintuitive and surprising given the common belief in consumer returns literature that
high salesperson competence should reduces returns (Ferguson et al., 2006; Ofek et al., 2011).
To further understand the underlying reason for this finding, I obtain additional documents
from Diamond regarding its salespeople training. I find that as expected, the training aims to
increase product knowledge and emphasizes the importance of (1) understanding customer
needs by asking the right questions and (2) providing detailed product information to match
customers with the right product. However, I also find that the training requires salespeople
to excite customers by emphasizing multiple product attributes and by romancing the prod-
uct through making a connection between the customer and the product as well. Therefore,
I conjecture that excessively high provision of information and exciting customers with the
product may unnecessarily increase customer expectations beyond what the product can
actually deliver. This, in turn, may reduce the postpurchase perceived valuation and lead
to a subsequent return. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical finding that
establishes how a salesperson who provides information to reduce product valuation uncer-
tainty may indeed induce a subsequent return by overselling a product if the information
unnecessarily increases expectations from the product.
Interestingly, for the Diamond store environment, I find that returns are more likely to
occur when customers perceive a store’s environment to be nice and comfortable. Intuitively,
one would think that setting an environment to better display products should potentially
increase the likelihood of product fit, and therefore, reduce returns. As is typical in any
jewelry store, Diamond stores display products in cases that are equipped with advanced
lighting to ensure that jewelries and diamonds shine and sparkle. I believe that while this
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specific setting increases the attractiveness of a product, as with the salesperson competence,
it is also likely to increase a customer’s expectation about the appearance of the product.
When the customer leaves the store and puts on the jewelry or diamond under normal
lighting, it may no longer look the way it looked in the store. Therefore, the customer’s
expectation about the product appearance is not met, resulting in a return. It is possible to
see similar situations in different retail contexts. For instance, a customer who purchases an
ultra HD curved TV based on the screen quality displayed in a store may be disappointed
later if she does not have the ultra HD broadcast at home and uses the TV with a traditional
broadcast. Similarly, apparel purchased based on how it looks on a mannequin or a furniture
set purchased based on how it looks in a showroom where there is special lighting and wide
space are potential examples that may result in subsequent returns due to the mismatch
between the store environment and the home or daily use environment.
In a post hoc analysis, I group returns based on the time between the original purchase
and returns (time to return) and assess how customer experience influences returns that
occur at different times. I find that, except for the store environment, service quality and
product quality do not explain return behaviors of customers who return their products
on the day of their purchase (0-day). Note that Diamond stores are located in shopping
malls and competition between jewelry retailers are typically high in malls. Therefore, I
believe that 0-day returners are potentially customers who do comparison shopping. These
customers potentially value the price more than the service quality offered in-store. Hence,
even if the customers are satisfied with their in-store experiences, they may still return their
purchases so long as they find a better price for the quality they seek. I observe that store
environment indeed reduces 0-day returns, implying that customers who do comparison-
shopping associate store environment with the product quality. For returns that occur at
other times, I find that perceived product quality is an ultimate factor that explains return
behaviors. The main findings hold for customers who return their products within two
weeks. I also observe that satisfaction with a purchase experience does not influence return
behaviors of customers who return their products beyond two weeks.
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2.7.2 The Impact of Returns on Repurchase
Given the increasing marketplace claims that suggest customers will shop more often if
they experience a positive return, this study examines how customer satisfaction with a pur-
chase influences repurchase behavior for two different groups: returners and non-returners.
Theoretically, I contribute to the literature by introducing a return event as another factor
that moderates the link between satisfaction and repurchase behavior. The findings suggest
that a return event is likely to increase customer repurchase behavior. However, the impact
of a return event on repurchase behavior dependd on a customer’s satisfaction level during
a purchase. Satisfied customers are typically loyal and demonstrate a certain level of re-
purchase behavior. For these customers, a return event further increases their repurchase
behavior. For dissatisfied customers, I observe that after a dissatisfactory shopping experi-
ence, customers almost stop shopping with the firm. However, this study demonstrates that
a return event turns these customers into loyal ones. This implies that a return event is
critical for retailers to regain a dissatisfied customers that would otherwise be lost. It also
represents another point of the retailers service offering that is highly valued by customers.
Finally, in the post hoc analysis, I compared repurchase behavior of customers who
return their products at different return epochs. Evidently, the repurchase behavior of zero-
day returners is not different from the repurchase behavior of non-returners, implying that a
return event does not influence the repurchase behavior of comparison-shopping customers.
I observe that the main findings are consistent for customers who return their products
between day one and day 45 after the initial purchase. As for the returns that occur beyond
45 days, Diamond store managers note that many of these late returns arise from customers
who appear to act opportunistically. That is, these customers commonly return expensive
items at the end of the return period. In contrast to the main findings, I observe that the
effect of a return event on the repurchase behavior of these late returners does not vary with
their satisfaction level. This is expected since, regardless of the level of satisfaction with the
purchase, these late returners will continue to purchase from the same retailer so long as
they are allowed to return.
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2.7.3 Managerial Implications
The findings provide actionable ideas for retail managers who seek to prevent consumer
returns or otherwise maximize value from the return process. This study shows that product
quality, service quality, and customer satisfaction are key factors for returns management.
Ensuring customer satisfaction during a purchase event reduces the likelihood of a subse-
quent return. Customer satisfaction is critical for retail managers as it not only reduces
returns, but more importantly, increases future sales. The link to future sales, however, is
not always recognized. This is particularly so for store managers and salespeople that work
on commission. Their income incentive has them focused on getting the sale today, without
regard to long-term customer satisfaction. My observations of salespeople at Diamond in-
dicate that they often rely on the return policy as a sales mechanism, perhaps as much as
customers rely on the return policy as an insurance against dissatisfaction. It is far easier
for salespeople to rightfully inform customers that they can return a product if they are not
100% satisfied than to ensure customers that they will be 100% satisfied by finding the right
product match in the first place. This practice arises even though it leads to lower customer
satisfaction and higher returns, and in turn, actually lower commissions for salespeople. Not
only due returns increase, but the value of the customer relationship declines. The findings
suggest that retailers should provide an incentive that balances the long-term relationship
with the short-term sale. Indeed, a long-term profitable customer relationship and successful
short-term sales are not incompatible as I clearly demonstrate that increasing customer sat-
isfaction reduces returns. Managers can balance these long-term and short-term objectives
by tying compensation to a quantifiable measure of satisfaction (e.g. customer satisfaction
surveys).
From the product side, returns are less likely to occur when customers perceive products
to be of high quality. It is not just that retailers need to supply the requisite quality, but that
customers perceive it. My experience with Diamond indicates that although the company
consistently provides high quality throughout its stores, customer perceptions of quality
vary significantly. This variation arises between stores and over time, although the same
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products are offered. I conjecture that the perception of product quality may vary due to
ignorance and lack of experience. If customers do not see it, know it, or understand it, they
will not perceive it. In essence, for a variety of products, particularly technology products,
customers require an education. Without it, customers may perceive low quality when it
does not exist or otherwise rely on inaccurate or improper quality cues. For jewelry, it is clear
that an education in diamond quality is a prerequisite for understanding what constitutes
high quality. Diamond quality is determined by what are known as the 4Cs: carat, color,
clarity, and, cut. While some customers may not be aware of these factors at all, other
customers may not understand how the 4Cs work together to determine a diamond’s overall
quality. A jewelry retailer that offers high quality diamonds can prevent returns due to low
perceived quality by educating its customers about the 4Cs during a purchase event.
From the service delivery side, a competent salesperson who can identify a customer’s
needs and provide product information to meet those needs will potentially reduce the cus-
tomer’s uncertainty about the product and therefore, prevent a future return. However, over-
selling a product or providing too much information can unnecessarily increase a customer’s
expectations from the product and potentially result in a return due to a disconfirmation of
expectations. Retailers typically increase salesperson competence by investing in training.
While training investments are likely to increase salesperson competence overall, this study
demonstrates that this increase may result in undesired consequences when returns are not
considered. Therefore, retailers should design their training modules to ensure that sales-
people set reasonable expectations that actually can be met by the product. In addition, I
find that a store environment that increases expectations from products, increases returns as
well. To prevent returns, retailers should carefully design their store environment so that the
product appears and functions approximately the same way as it would appear and function
outside the store during the customer use after the purchase.
While I provide actionable prescriptions for return prevention, I also note that a return
event can actually lead to an enhanced customer relationship. I demonstrate that customers
highly value a retailer’s return policy and increase their repurchase behavior after they
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experience a return. More interestingly, I show that during a return event, retailers can
regain a dissatisfied customer who otherwise would be lost. These findings suggest that
retailers should actively track customer satisfaction and, in fact, should persuade dissatisfied
customers to return their initial purchases. In these cases, the results demonstrate that the
the short-term loss of a return is more than compensated through an increase in future
purchase behavior.
Finally, in the present era of big data and predictive data analytics, many major retailers
have access to transaction data and survey data similar to the data I use in my research. this
study illustrates how managers can use these data to analyze their operational performances
from the customer perspective and to identify return drivers and customer returner segments
that can potentially be improved.
2.7.4 Limitations and Future Research
While this study provides fruitful findings for retailers, it has certain limitations. Even
though the data include transactions made by over a million customers and represent a very
wide range of purchase and return behaviors, thid study is based on observations from a
single firm. While the data fit my goal of explaining the return rate variation across stores
within a single company, I am not able to compare the results to another retail setting with
different product categories. Future research should examine how return behavior across
stores within a single company differs in different retail contexts. Second, I am not able to
identify the underlying reason behind a return. Many organizations, including Diamond,
ask for and record verbal feedback on why customers return an item, yet such feedback
can be fraught with its own data issues due to lack of truthfulness, customer opportunism,
and error-prone textual recording of the feedback. Even though I conduct the analysis after
eliminating returns due to a repair transaction or a trade-in transaction, future research that
categorizes returns based on the reason such as defect, buyer’s remorse, or mismatch would
potentially reveal further details in return prevention. Third, I am not able to identify why a
return increases repurchase behavior. It is not clear whether the satisfaction with the return
service or the returning option itself leads to increased repurchase behavior. Future research
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can also shed light on return event as I do on purchase event.
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3. OPEN-BOX RETURNS: TRASH OR TREASURE TROVE?
3.1 Introduction
Retailers are inundated with product returns and the situation has only been exacerbated
in recent years with the tremendous growth of remote purchases through the Internet. Even
brick-and-mortar establishments often must contend with a veritable flood of returns. The
competitive dynamics of the marketplace, combined with ever-demanding consumers, means
product returns are now business-as-usual. Consider that the annual value of returned goods
in U.S. retailing increased from $188.9 billion in 2007 to $267.3 billion in 2013 (NRF, 2007,
2013). With no end in sight, let alone a decrease in their volume, retailers must contend
with how best to handle the returns they accumulate. The answer is not trivial, nor are the
consequences insignificant. In 2007 alone, the U.S. electronic industry spent an estimated
$13.8 billion to repackage and resell returned merchandize (Lawton, 2008). Indeed, returns
can reduce profits by as much as 35% (Hewitt, 2008).
One common option for retailers to handle the returns they collect is to salvage the
returns by selling them to third party liquidators at a deep discount. However, this is a
costly method since retailers recoup only 10%-20% of the original value of returned products
(Stock et al., 2006). For instance, Best Buy, a consumer electronics company with around a
10% return rate, lost about $400 million annually in the past by selling returned products to
third-party liquidators (Lee, 2014 (accessed May 30, 2014). Therefore, retailers often pursue
other options for handling returns. One such option is to send product returns back to the
manufacturer for credit. Retailers may also attempt to remarket those products themselves.
In fact, some retailers have even developed their own secondary retail channels to remarket
the returns from their primary branded outlets. Nordstrom Rack and other outlet stores are
prime examples of such remarketing efforts. Recycling and donating returns to charity are
some other, less common alternatives for disposing returns.
Increasingly, retailers are turning to selling returns in their own primary outlets, side-
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by-side with their new product offerings. By use of the term side-by-side, I mean that both
returns and new products are available for sale to customers in stores at the same time.
An industry report by UPS indicates that companies that process returns internally and
resell them in a timely manner save more and earn more from their returned products than
those that liquidate returns through a secondary market (Greve and Davis, 2012). Even so,
it remains unclear how and under what conditions a retail strategy of selling internally, as
opposed to third party liquidators, should be implemented. This study addresses this issue.
A complicating factor for managing returns is their condition. Generally, I can distinguish
two types of returns: closed-box and open-box. Closed-box returns, by definition, means that
the items have not been opened by customers and are in good-as-new condition, as if they
have never been sold in the first place. In essence, closed-box returns are indistinguishable
from new products. Open-box returns, in contrast, are not good as new. Often, the packaging
is torn, items have not been repackaged correctly, or there may exist some other cosmetic
issues or slight imperfections. Selling these returns as new may create complications. In the
past, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Toys ’R’ Us Inc. were accused of routinely mispresenting and
selling returned products as new (WSJ, 1993). Indeed, it is illegal to sell open-box products
as new without proper disclosure. Moreover, state-specific regulations might restrict selling
returned products as new. For instance, at a national jewelry retailer chain that I study, a
returned watch cannot be sold as new in certain states, regardless of its condition.
Still, retailers often sell open-box products side-by-side with new products, albeit at a
lower price than the new product price. As part of its Renew Blue strategy, Best Buy set
aside an area in stores for just this purpose. By doing so, the company significantly reduced
its losses due to liquidating returns in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. The company also
plans to move all its online open-box products from its secondary website called CowBoom
to its main BestBuy website over time (Seitz, 2013 (accessed May 30, 2014). Similarly, many
consumer electronics retailers including Dell, Amazon.com, Newegg.com, and Walmart, sell
some of their open-box products at a discounted price along with their new products. Clearly,
selling product returns along with new products is nothing new. However, many other
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retailers either abstain completely from this practice or limit it with certain products. An
often-heard concern is that open-box products cannibalize sales of new products. When and
under what conditions is the strategy of selling returns as open-box products better than the
strategy of salvaging them? What is the impact of cannibalization due to open-box products
on new product sales and profitability?
At the policy level, a host of fundamental questions arise that, to the extent I am aware,
have not been addressed in the literature. In particular, I am interested in answering man-
agerial questions related to product price, restocking fee, and order quantity since these are
the key levers that affect a firm’s ability to operationally match supply with demand. Even
when I look to industry for guidance on policy, the answers to operational level questions
are not clear. First, consider the issue of product price. I can observe a variety of dif-
ferent pricing strategies for open-box products. Some retailers apply very small discounts,
while others offer larger savings of up to 25% (Consumer-Reports, 2008 (accessed Jun 27,
2014). A discounted price will attract more price-sensitive customers who normally would
not purchase a new version of the same product. At the same time, open-box products at
low prices may cannibalize part of new product demand. What is the right pricing strategy
to sell open-box products vis-a`-vis new products?
The second managerial lever, a restocking fee, has both supply-side and demand-side
effects, the combined effects of which are not clear. Common wisdom suggests that retailers
can influence demand through return policies by applying a restocking fee. A lenient return
policy with a low restocking fee is likely to increase demand (Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk,
2009; Akcay et al., 2013). It is also likely to reduce profits due to the increased cost of
handling returns (Hewitt, 2008). Indeed, it is a question whether or not the benefit of
higher demand due to a lenient return policy outweighs the cost of higher returns. As with
pricing of open-box products, when I look to industry for guidance on policy, I observe a wide
range of restocking fees. A 2005 survey indicates that 44% of retailers charge restocking fees
on returns (Akcay et al., 2013), and these fees can be significant. For returned electronic
goods, Target and NewEgg.com charge customers a 15% restocking fee and Amazon.com
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and RitzCamera.com apply a restocking fee of up to 25%. Under what conditions should
retailers charge a restocking fee for returns and by what amount? How does the restocking
fee influence the sales price of open-box products and if so by how much?
The third managerial lever with regard to product returns is the order quantity for new
product inventory. In essence, the pool of returned products may serve as another potential
source of supply. Since returns can be resold to satisfy demand, retailers may require fewer
new products. This issue is especially crucial for products that have short selling seasons and
high return rates like apparel. Should retailers alter their order quantities for new products
in anticipation of product returns and if so by how much? This study aims to answer these
and similar questions as they relate to selling both new and returned products together.
This paper compares two different strategies for handling returns: salvaging returns
or selling them as open-box products along with new products. I model the problem for
a retailer that sells a single product, charges customers a restocking fee for returns, and
segments the market for new and open-box products. Demands from both segments are
satisfied by selling new and open-box products side-by-side over a single selling season.
The operational decisions of interest are the price of open-box products, the restocking fee
for returns, and the order quantity for new product. The retailer has a single ordering
opportunity before the season starts. Customers are heterogenous in their valuations of new
and open-box products and realize their product fit after purchase.
The modeling contribution of this paper to the literature is three-fold. First, I address
the strategy of reselling returns during the selling season when there is imperfect substitution
between new and returned products. Second, I distinguish product returns based on their
condition (i.e. closed-box vs. open-box) and consider a different reselling option for each
condition. Finally, I model a customer’s sensitivity to a retailer’s return policy as a deter-
minant for her utility from purchasing a new product. The last contribution is particularly
meaningful as it leads to important and interesting insights for managers.
I summarize the key findings as follows. First, when at least some customers in the
market prefer open-box products to new products, selling returns as open-box is always a
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more profitable strategy than simply salvaging them. This arises even though open-box
products cannibalize demand for new products. Second, retailers may increase their overall
market share by selling returns as open-box if customers are insensitive to a retailer’s return
policy. If customers are indeed sensitive, retailers should use a generous policy to increase
demand for new products and charge premium prices. There are some unexpected results.
For instance, higher return rates do not necessarily lead to a decrease in profit. Moreover,
when product returns increase, retailers do not need to decrease the price to sell all open-
box products. The intuition is that restricting return policy to prevent returns will increase
demand for open-box products.
I organize the rest of this paper as follows: In §3.2, I review the relevant literature. In
§3.3, I introduce the modeling framework and discuss my assumptions. In §3.4, I define the
model and derive analytical insights. In §3.5, I discuss several practical practical extensions
to the model. Finally, §3.6 summarizes the research and provides future research directions.
3.2 Literature Review
This study draws upon three separate streams within the overall product returns liter-
ature in closed loop supply chain management: return policy, inventory management, and
remanufacturing. I review each stream and position this work with respect to them.
3.2.1 Return Policy
A return policy should clearly indicate (1) the refund amount paid (or the restocking
fee charged) to a customer for returning a product, (2) the time period in which customers
are allowed to return a product, and (3) the level of hassle that identifies the restrictions
imposed on customers who return a product. Despite a few studies that address the time
period (Ulku et al., 2013) and the level of hassle (Davis et al., 1998), most literature in this
stream study return policies with respect to the refund amount.
Return policies differ in their leniency and range from a no return policy to a full return
policy. In a no return policy, returns are not allowed. A full return policy allows customers
to be fully reimbursed for the returned products if they are not satisfied with their purchase.
54
Any policy between the two is called a partial return policy and that is the policy I address
in this study. With a partial return policy, retailers charge a restocking fee for each return.
Early papers on partial return polices investigate the use of a restocking fee to avoid inap-
propriate returns from customers who have no intention of keeping the product in the first
place (Hess et al., 1996; Chu et al., 1998). Subsequent papers study partial return policies
within the context of quality and discuss how such policies can be used to signal product
quality (Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra, 2007; Hsiao and Chen, 2012; Li et al., 2013).
Motivated by the marketing literature, a few studies have addressed return policies for
segmented markets. Among them, Yalabik et al. (2005) show that the refund amount will
be less than the product price when both high-valued and low-valued segments are allowed
to return a product. However, if sales are final for one segment, then the retailer may offer a
refund greater than the product price for the other segment. Swinney (2011) studies a firm
that adopts a quick response production strategy and sells to two different segments: strate-
gic (forward-looking) and non-strategic (myopic) customers. He shows that, under a partial
return policy, the firm’s profit and the value of quick response are greater with strategic cus-
tomers than non-strategic customers when a return is less costly for customers than for the
firm. Shulman et al. (2009) study the optimal restocking fee for a horizontally segmented
market when customers have a choice among multiple products. They demonstrate that
multiple products enable a retailer to convert some returns into product exchanges. This
is one way to recoup the cost of returned products. Hence, the retailer provides a refund
greater than the salvage value. Shulman et al. (2011) extend the literature for horizontal
segmentation under competition. They show that the optimal restocking fee is higher under
competition than when the retailer is a monopolist. In this case, a high restocking fee is
designed to prevent customers from returning a product and subsequently buying from a
competitor.
This stream of literature addresses return policies without the consideration of inventory
management. I fill this gap by addressing the inventory order quantity decision along with
a partial return policy for a segmented market.
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3.2.2 Inventory Management
Returned products may enable retailers to satisfy demand more than once with the same
unit of inventory. Therefore, the order quantity for new product can be less when there
are returns. From a modeling perspective, I see two common assumptions in the literature
with respect to return handling: (1) retailers restock returned products and sell them as
new (also known as the perfect substitution assumption) and (2) they do nothing specific to
remarket returns themselves, but rather simply obtain a salvage value from selling them to
a secondary market or sending them back to manufacturers.
In a seminal piece in this area, Vlachos and Dekker (2003) introduce a single period
model with resalable returns and derive an optimal order quantity for a retailer under the
perfect substitution assumption. Later, Mostard and Teunter (2006) extend this model by
relaxing some restrictive assumptions - most notably that returned products can be resold
only once and that a fixed percentage of sold products is returned and resalable. They
show that the order quantity decision is different when a returned product is resalable more
than once. In both papers, the demand and the price of the product are exogenous. In a
two period model, Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk (2009) derive a model with resalable returns to
determine the optimal order quantity for a retailer that sells to customers who are sensitive
to both price and return policy. Chen and Bell (2009) extend the literature by introducing
a multi-period model for a retailer that sells to price sensitive customers and modifies his
pricing and ordering decisions in time to respond to customer returns.
Largely motivated by the marketing literature, recent studies consider the behavioral as-
pects of consumer returns. A typical assumption is that customers face valuation uncertainty
and realize their true valuation only after purchase. Within this context, Su (2009) studies
a newsvendor model under a full return policy and a partial return policy. He shows that
the retailer’s profit and optimal order quantity are higher under the partial return policy
than they are under the full return policy. In both models, he assumes that returns are not
resold, but are simply salvaged.
To the best of my knowledge, Akcay et al. (2013) is the closest paper to my own. They
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extend the literature by introducing the option of selling returned products as open-box at a
discounted price from the new product price. The authors show that this approach enables
the retailer to increase the refund amount and the price of the new product compared to
doing nothing and salvaging all returns. The open-box products are sold to satisfy demand
for the new product only if the new product inventory is depleted. The implicit assumption
is that open-box products are never offered to customers along with new products at the
same time. In contrast, I allow the retailer to sell open-box and new products side-by-side.
3.2.3 Remanufacturing
Remanufacturing is a production strategy to recover the residual value of returned prod-
ucts. Remanufacturing involves collecting used products that are at or near their end-of-life,
reusing parts that are functioning well, and replacing worn-out parts with new ones. Souza
(2013) provides a detailed and recent review of the area. Here, I am limiting my scope of
the remanufacturing literature to include only those papers that (1) address a manufacturer
who sells new and remanufactured products simultaneously and (2) consider behavioral as-
pects of product valuation. The planning horizon generally involves two or more periods.
It is common that the manufacturer only produces new products in the first period, but
has the option to make new and remanufactured products in subsequent periods. In this
context, remanufactured products are produced from products returned in prior periods.
Even though the context is different, the second and the subsequent periods of a remanu-
facturing problem are similar to the single period problem. They are similar in the sense
that in a remanufacturing (our) problem, (1) returned products are sold as remanufactured
(sold as open-box), (2) remanufactured (open-box) products and new products are offered
side-by-side, and (3) remanufactured (open-box) products are valued less than new products
by customers (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Akcay et al., 2013).
Early papers in remanufacturing assume that there is perfect substitution between a
new product and its remanufactured counterpart such that remanufactured units are sold
good as new (Toktay et al., 2000). More recent papers relax this assumption (Debo et al.,
2005; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Atasu et al., 2008b) and this paper is comparable to
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this literature. From a modeling perspective, there are two key aspects of these papers
that are relevant to my own study. First, they all assume that the demands for new and
remanufactured products are functions of prices. Second, demands are deterministic. While
I also examine the case of deterministic demand, I extend my analysis to the stochastic
case. Another key differentiating aspect of my model is that new and open-box demands are
functions of both prices and refund amount.
3.3 Model Framework
I consider a retailer that sells a single product to customers under a partial return policy.
There are three decisions: the price for open-box product, the refund amount paid for
returned product, and the order quantity for new product. The price for new product is
exogenously determined. This represents the case in which retailers sell new products at the
manufacturer suggested retail price (MSRP). This is a common pricing strategy observed in
consumer electronics industry when a new product is introduced to the market due to either
high level of competition or policies such as price matching or MSRP.
I assume a single selling season. Before the beginning of the season, the retailer purchases
an initial stock of Q units from her supplier at unit cost c, sells new products at the MSRP
pn, and sells open-box products at unit price po. Any unsold units remaining at the end of
the season, either new or returned, are salvaged at a price s per unit. I assume that s < c
so that it is not practical to purposely stock for salvage.
3.3.1 Returns Process and Restocking
Customers return products if they are not satisfied. For each return, the retailer reim-
burses the customer a refund amount r, where s ≤ r ≤ pn. I assume r ≥ s; otherwise,
customers would salvage products by themselves rather than returning them to the retailer.
Craigslist and eBay are illustrative examples of self-salvaging. Note that pn − r represents
a restocking fee. A returned product can be either closed-box with a probability of α or
open-box with a probability of 1−α. I do not consider defective returns since they typically
account for a small portion of all returns and would add unnecessary complexity to the
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model (Douthit et al., 2011).
I assume that both open-box and closed-box returns are offered side-by-side with new
products for the entire season. I observe that in practice, a majority of all returns occur
within a few days after purchase. For example, 36% of all returns occur within two days after
purchase at a national jewelry retailer chain I study. Given that a selling season usually lasts
an extended number of weeks, it is reasonable to assume that open-box and new products
are sold simultaneously over the entire length of the selling season.
Closed-box returns are indistinguishable from new products. Hence, they are sold at
the same price pn. I assume that the cost of restocking returned products is negligible.
Typically, restocking is one of many responsibilities of store employees and they are not
paid an additional amount for such a task. For instance, Best Buy’s Geek Squad team is
responsible for assessing the functionality of a returned product before restocking, as well
as customer services such as consultation, installation and setup, repair, trade-in, etc. I also
assume that sales of all open-box products are final; there is no refund offered for open-box
products. This too is common in practice (e.g. Newegg.com and RitzCamera.com). Note
that a return increases either the net inventory of open-box returns (if it is open-box) or the
net inventory of new products (if it is closed-box).
3.3.2 Consumer Behavior and Choice Process
I model three types of consumer behavior: purchase behavior, return behavior, and
product valuation behavior. These behaviors are explained by utility theory. Prior to a
purchase, customers have an expectation about the value of a product. If the expected value
is greater than the product price, customers purchase the product since the net utility from
purchasing is greater than zero. A customer obtains zero utility if no product is purchased.
Customers realize their valuation after evaluating their product fit, which occurs only after
purchase. A customer gets zero utility if the product fails to meet expectations and this
occurs with a probability of λ. In this case, customers will return the product so long as
there is a positive refund amount. Hereafter, when I use the term valuation, I refer to the
expected valuation.
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Open-box products are attractive to price-sensitive customers who are looking to pay
less for high quality products (Lee, 2014 (accessed May 30, 2014). Similar to Akcay et al.
(2013), I assume that consumers value open-box products less than new products since they
have been opened and probably used by others. I address heterogenous customers who are
differentiated by an intrinsic valuation parameter V for a unit of new product and assume it
to be uniformly distributed on the standard Hotelling line between 0 and 1. Each customer’s
valuation for an open-box product is a fraction β of his valuation for the new product. A
customer’s value for an open-box product is βv, where 0 < β < 1. Note that β = 1 implies
that an open-box product is a perfect substitute for a new product. To avoid triviality, I
assume βv > s; otherwise, the retailer would purposely salvage all open-box returns rather
than attempting to sell them. I normalize the size of the market to one.
A return policy heavily influences a customer’s purchase decision (Hsiao and Chen, 2012),
and therefore, demand (Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro, 2005). A 2014 consumer survey
administered by UPS indicates that 82% of respondents would complete a sale if they could
return the item for free, whereas only 20% would purchase if returns are not allowed (UPS,
2014). To model this behavior, I assume that a generous return policy, represented by a
high value of r, will increase product valuation and, therefore, generate higher demand. A
one unit increase in r increases the product valuation by γr, where 0 < γ ≤ 1. Here, γ is a
constant that represents consumer sensitivity to the refund amount.
Customers are risk neutral and make their decisions based on the prices and the refund
amount to maximize their expected utility. Therefore, customers will purchase the product
that provides the highest utility, so long as it is available. If it is not available, I assume that
customers do not consider the alternative product and leave without a purchase. I explore
product substitutability as an extension later. I ignore opportunistic behavior and assume
that all returns are legitimate. Moreover, I do not separately consider the cost of returning
for the customer since it can be considered as part of the term γr in the product valuation.
For instance, a customer with a high cost of returning will likely have a lower γ than a
customer with a low cost of returning.
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The order of events is given as follows. (1) Before the season starts, the retailer determines
the refund amount r, the price of the open-box return po, and the initial stock Q to maximize
her expected profit. (2) Market demands for both types of product (new and open-box) are
realized. Each arriving customer makes a purchase decision (buy or not) and a product choice
(new vs. open-box) based on his/her valuation and product availability. (3) Customers who
purchased a product realize their individual valuations. If a customer has purchased a new
product, he/she decides to keep it or return it for the refund r. Finally, (4) the retailer
salvages all leftover products at the end of the selling season. I summarize the notation in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Table of notation
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition
pn new product price po open-box product price
r refund amount c procurement cost
s salvage value v customer valuation for new products
β valuation discount factor γ refund amount sensitivity
λ probability that a product is returned α fraction of returns that are closed-box
dn new product demand do open-box product demand
Q order quantity
3.3.3 Demand Functions
I derive the demand functions of new products and open-box products directly from
consumer utility functions, as is common in the closed-loop supply chain literature (Debo
et al., 2005; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Atasu et al., 2008a). The utilities from purchasing
a new product and an open-box product are Un = v+γr−pn and Uo = βv−po, respectively.
When a customer has an option to buy either a new product or an open-box product, she
makes her decision based on the comparison of her utilities for both products. All customers
whose valuations satisfy v+γr−pn ≥ 0 would consider buying a new product. The customer
with valuation vn = pn − γr is indifferent to buying a new product or not buying at all.
Similarly, the customer with valuation vo = poβ is indifferent to buying an open-box product
61
or not buying at all. Finally, a customer with valuation vno = pn−po−γr1−β is indifferent between
new and open-box products, and if the valuation exceeds this, she prefers the new product.
I demonstrate the three points of indifference in Figure 3.1 for two different cases.
Figure 3.1: Demand for both products
When vn > vo (or pn − γr > poβ ), it can be readily shown that vno > vn > vo. In
this case, as illustrated in Figure 3.1(a), all customers with valuation in the interval [vno, 1]
prefer to buy a new product and all those in the interval [vo, vno] prefer to buy an open-box
product. Customers whose valuations are in [0, vo] do not buy anything. When vn ≤ vo
(or pn − γr ≤ poβ ), vo > vn > vno. This implies that no customer will buy an open-box
product since any customer with a positive utility for an open-box product always prefers a
new product (Figure 3.1(b)). All customers whose valuations are in the interval [vn, 1] will
buy a new product.
Because the customer valuation follows a uniform distribution, I can define the following
piecewise-linear demand functions for new (dn) and open-box (do) products:
dn =

1− pn−po−γr1−β if pn − γr > poβ
1− pn + γr if pn − γr ≤ poβ
(3.1)
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do =

βpn−po−βγr
β(1−β) if pn − γr > poβ
0 if pn − γr ≤ poβ
(3.2)
Hereafter, I refer to the demand for new products as new demand and the demand for
open-box products as open-box demand. Equations 3.1 and 3.2 imply that when pn−γr > p0,
any increase in the price of one product reduces the demand for that product and increases
the demand for the other product. Similarly, any increase in the refund amount increases
new demand and decreases open-box demand. In contrast, any increase in β shifts the
demand from new products to open-box products. I also note that when pn − γr ≤ poβ , the
retailer can only sell new products. When pn − γr > poβ , the retailer can (1) sell both new
and open-box products or (2) sell only new products. Therefore, selling only new products
is always an option for the retailer regardless of model parameters. I refer to the strategy of
selling only new products as the single-product portfolio strategy (SPPS) and to the strategy
of selling both products as the two-product portfolio strategy (TPPS).
3.4 Model Analysis
In this section, I first introduce the retailer’s objective function, provide the optimal
solutions, and show a set of propositions to identify how the retailer determines her product
portfolio strategy. Then, I analyze the optimal return policy for the retailer and demonstrate
how the return policy changes based on the product portfolio choice. I also look at the
cannibalization of new demand due to open-box products and assess the impact of it on
profitability. Finally, I conduct a sensitivity analysis for the optimal decision variables.
3.4.1 Optimal Solutions and Product Portfolio Strategy
Recall that a product return is closed-box with probability of α. Since closed-box returns
are sold as new, they can be returned more than once so long as they remain unopened.
Following the analysis in Mostard and Teunter (2006), I assume that a product can be sold
like new (1+αλ+(αλ)2 + . . . ) = 11−αλ times, where λ represents the probability of returning
a new product. Hence, I can assume that the retailer can satisfy new demand of dn units
when she orders Q = (1−αλ)dn products due to closed-box returns. The retailer’s objective
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function is
max Π(po, r,Q) = pndn︸︷︷︸
new sales
− rλdn︸ ︷︷ ︸
returned
+ po min{do, (1− α)λdn}︸ ︷︷ ︸
open-box sales
+ s[(1− α)λdn − do]+︸ ︷︷ ︸
not sold open-box
−cQ
(3.3)
The first term in equation 3.3 corresponds to the revenue from the sales of new products
and closed-box returns. The second term indicates the refund amount paid to customers
for returned products. The third term corresponds to the revenue from open-box products.
The fourth term represents the revenue from salvaging all unsold open-box products. Note
that I allow the number of open-box returns to be greater than the open-box demand. This
represents the case that the benefit due to increased new demand through a higher refund
amount outweighs the loss due to excess open-box returns. The last term is simply the
procurement cost. Maximizing the objective function with respect to po and r gives the
optimal solution. Note that the optimal order quantity can be derived using the optimal
solutions for po and r.
Proposition 1. The retailer’s optimal refund amount r∗, optimal open-box product price
p∗o, and resulting optimal order quantity Q∗ for the SPPS and for the TPPS on the domain
Ω = {(dn, do, β) : do ≤ λ(1− α)dn, 0 < β < β˜ = 4λγ(λ+γ)2 } are summarized in Table 3.2.
I present proofs for all propositions and technical results in Appendix C. Note that,
in Proposition 1, while the optimal solutions for the SPPS hold regardless of the values of
model parameters, the optimal solutions for the TPPS are only valid on the domain Ω. The
domain has two restrictions. First, do ≤ λ(1 − α)dn corresponds to the case in which the
open-box demand is less than or equal to the available open-box returns. The company
I study offers its customers 6,111 different open-box products side-by-side with their new
products and open-box returns account for 40% of all returns. I observe that, for only 157
SKUs, do ≤ λ(1−α)dn. Second, β < β˜ puts an upper limit on the valuation discount factor
β, below which optimality is guaranteed. For instance, for all combinations of λ ∈ (0.1, 0.4)
and γ ∈ (0.1, 0.4), I find that β˜ ∈ (0.64, 1). I conclude that optimal solutions exist for a
broad range of relevant parameter values. I also provide a method in Appendix D to compute
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Table 3.2: Optimal solutions for product portfolio strategies for a retailer
Optimal solution SPPS
p∗o -
r∗ (λ+γ)pn−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−λ2λγ
d∗n 1− pn + γr∗
d∗o 0
Q∗ (1− αλ)(1− pn + γr∗)
Optimal solution TPPS
p∗o
λβ(1−β)(λ+γ)−βpn(λ−γ)2+sγ[2λ−β(λ+γ)]−βγ(λ−γ)[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]
4λγ−β(λ+γ)2
r∗ 2(λ+γ)(1−β)pn−2λ(1−β)+s(γ−λ)−[2γ−β(λ+γ)][c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]
4λγ−β(λ+γ)2
d∗n 1− pn−p
∗
o−γr∗
1−β
d∗o
βpn−p∗o−βγr∗
β(1−β)
Q∗ (1− αλ)(1− pn−p∗o−γr∗1−β )
the optimal decisions when the model parameters are outside the domain Ω.
Proposition 1 establishes that an increase in new price also increases the refund amount.
This result is in line with earlier literature (Hess et al., 1996; Akcay et al., 2013) and confirms
that the insurance provided to the customer against a potential mismatch allows the retailer
to charge a premium. Moreover, new price and open-box price are negatively correlated
when the retailer follows the TPPS. Due to the complexity of the expressions in Proposition
1, further relationships between model parameters are not readily observable. Therefore, I
proceed to analytically derive several insights from the model.
To begin, I find that refund sensitivity γ is a key parameter with respect to model
behavior. I introduce a few thresholds for γ and demonstrate that the retailer’s optimal
decisions depend largely on the value of γ with respect to these thresholds. I start with the
relationship between new demand and new price in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There exists a threshold γ˜ = λ for refund sensitivity such that when the
sensitivity is above the threshold, new demand increases as new product price increases.
Proposition 2 demonstrates a very counter-intuitive result. One would expect that when
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the new product price increases, new demand decreases. However, I observe the opposite
when γ > γ˜. The reason is that the new demand is a function of both pn and r. When γ > γ˜,
r is the primary determinant for demand. From Proposition 1, I know that r increases with
an increase in pn. Therefore, the retailer attracts more customers with a high refund amount
than she loses due to a high price. Hence, the retailer uses a lenient return policy by offering
a high refund amount to increase new demand while charging premium prices. Nordstrom
is an illustrative example of such behavior; Nordstrom is a premium retailer with one of the
the most lenient return policies in retail. When γ < γ˜, the price is the primary determinant
for demand. Accordingly, new demand decreases with an increase in pn.
Proposition 3. There exists β∗ such that (1) both the SPPS and the TPPS are feasible
when β > β∗ and (2) only the SPPS is feasible when β ≤ β∗.
I report the expression for β∗ in Appendix C. Proposition 3 indicates that the threshold
level on the valuation discount factor, β, for an open-box product determines the feasibility of
the product portfolio strategies. When β ≤ β∗, there is no demand for open-box products.
Personal hygiene products (e.g. electric shaver, electric toothbrush) represent one such
product category. When β > β∗, demands for both products are strictly positive so that
both strategies are feasible.
For increasingly higher values of β beyond β∗, open-box demand increases relative to new
demand since the valuation difference between the two products diminishes and open-box
products are offered at a discount. Indeed, open-box products increasingly cannibalize sales
of new products as β increases towards one. Theoretically, when β is large enough, open-box
products are so attractive relative to new products that all customers prefer the open-box
product. In the model, this point occurs at β = 1 − pn + po + γr. For this improbable
scenario, what the retailer should do is simply set po and r such that sales of open-box
products are maximized. In this way, the market for both demands is always cleared and
there is no leftover inventory. To do so, optimal solution involves solving the problem so
that do = λ(1−α)dn. For the analysis, I ignore this trivial and meaningless case and restrict
my attention to cases where β < 1− pn + po + γr.
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Proposition 4. When refund sensitivity is below (above) the threshold γ˜, the range of β over
which it is optimal for the retailer to sell both new and open-box products expands (shrinks)
as the new product price increases. When pn = pˆn, β
∗ converges to β˜.
I provide the expression for pˆn in Appendix C. Proposition 4 establishes that new
product price determines the range for β over which both strategies are feasible. However,
the relationship between this range and pn is moderated by γ. I illustrate this relationship
in Figure 3.2. This figure shows the change in β∗ with respect to a change in pn for a
representative case. The figure clearly shows that β∗ converges to β˜ when the new price
is equal to the threshold pˆn. When γ < γ˜ (γ > γ˜,), the retailer only sells new products if
pn < pˆn (pn > pˆn).
Figure 3.2: The impact of new price on retailer’s product portfolio choice
When γ < γ˜, demand for new products decreases as pn increases (Proposition 2). Con-
sequently, some demand shifts from new products to open-box products. As can be seen
in Figure 3.2(a), this implies that the range of valuation for which an open-box product
generates positive customer utility increases as pn increases. When γ > γ˜, I observe the
opposite behavior. As seen in Figure 3.2(b), the range of β over which a TPPS is feasible
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decreases as pn increases. This implies that the TPPS becomes less attractive with an in-
crease in pn for the retailer. The intuition is that the demand shifts from open-box products
to new products as r increases (due to the increase in pn). Therefore, the range of customer
valuation for which an open-box product generates positive customer utility decreases as pn
increases.
3.4.2 Optimal Return Policy
In this section, I develop insights for the retailer’s optimal return policy. Note that the
retailer determines the leniency of her return policy by choosing a refund amount. I also
show how the optimal return policy changes based on the product portfolio choice.
Proposition 5. There exists pn and pn (i.e. pn < pn) such that the retailer offers a full
refund (i.e. r = pn) when pn ≥ pn and a partial refund (i.e. r < pn) when pn < pn. The
partial refund is equal to the salvage value s when pn ≤ pn.
I report pn and pn in Appendix C. While Proposition 5 is in line with previous literature
that suggests that retailers should charge a restocking fee (e.g. Hess et al. (1996); Su (2009);
Akcay et al. (2013)) under certain conditions, it also provides theoretical support for the
wide range of return policies including the full return policy that I observe in practice. In
short, Proposition 5 implies that the retailer should offer a more generous return policy for
premium products compared to commodity products.
The thresholds pn and pn depend on the product portfolio strategy. This implies that
the refund amount also depends on the product portfolio strategy. In the next corollary,
I develop insight into this dependency. I do so by comparing the optimal refund amount
under the SPPS to that under the TPPS when both strategies are an option for the retailer
(i.e. when β > β∗).
Corollary 1. When refund sensitivity is less (greater) than γ˜, the refund amount for a
TPPS is greater (less) than the refund amount for a SPPS.
I find that a retailer should offer a more generous return policy when she sells her returns
as open-box products than when she salvages them. However, Corollary 1 shows that this is
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true only if refund sensitivity is low. In this case, the negative impact of curbing demand by
disallowing returns for open-box products is low, implying that the opportunity to sell returns
as open-box is high. In contrast, when γ > γ˜, this negative impact is high. Consequently,
the retailer who chooses a TPPS should restrict the return policy by providing a smaller
refund relative to the retailer who chooses a SPPS.
3.4.3 Cannibalization due to Open-box Products
In this section, I assess the impact of cannibalization due to open-box product sales on
market share and profitability. I do so by comparing the demands and optimal profits in the
SPPS to those in the TPPS when β > β∗. I demonstrate that cannibalization may either
increase or decrease the retailer’s market share depending on the refund sensitivity, γ. I
also show that even with cannibalization of new products, the retailer is always better-off
by selling her returns as open-box rather than salvaging them.
Proposition 6. There exists a threshold γˆ = (2−β)λβ for refund sensitivity such that when
γ < γˆ (γ > γˆ), the total market share under a TPPS is greater (less) than the total market
share under a SPPS.
I demonstrate Proposition 6 in Figure 3.3. This figure shows the total market share
under both strategies. The top line corresponds to the case of SPPS where total market
share is composed solely of new demand. The middle and bottom lines correspond to the
cases of TPPS where total market share is compound of new demand and open-box demand
for γ > γˆ and γ < γˆ, respectively. Because customers are heterogenous with respect to
their valuations, new demand under the SPPS is always greater than new demand under the
TPPS. This implies that open-box products will always cannibalizes new products. Even
so, Proposition 6 establishes that, by selling open-box products, the retailer may expand
her market share when γ < γˆ. In this case, as illustrated in bottom line of Figure 3.3, the
decrease in new demand under the TPPS relative to the SPPS is less than that when γ > γˆ.
Besides, when γ < γˆ, some of the customers who do not buy a new product due to high price
under a SPPS find open-box products attractive under a TPPS. As a result, the increase in
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open-box demand exceeds the decrease in new demand. This, in turn, leads to an overall
increase in total market share. When γ > γˆ, the increase in open-box demand does not fully
compensate for the decrease in new demand and the retailer loses market share under the
TPPS compared to the SPPS.
Figure 3.3: Market share change with open-box products
Corollary 2. The optimal open-box price when γ > γˆ is greater than the optimal open-box
price when γ < γˆ.
Corollary 2, in conjunction with Proposition 6, establishes that if the TPPS obtains lower
market share than the SPPS, the retailer applies a higher open-box price than otherwise.
This arises because there are two groups of customers that account for open-box demand as
illustrated in Figure 3.3. The first group consists of those who would not buy a new product
when that is the only option. The second group consists of those customers who would buy
a new product under the SPPS but prefer an open-box product under the TPPS. When
γ < γˆ, the former group has lower valuation for open-box product than the later group.
This implies, on average, a low willingness-to-pay for open-box products. Accordingly, the
open-box price is relatively low. However, when γ > γˆ, the demand for open-box products
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comes only from the second group. This implies a higher willingness-to-pay on average for
open-box products than when γ < γˆ. Accordingly, the retailer imposes a high price for
open-box products.
Proposition 7. The profit under a TPPS is greater than the profit under a SPPS.
Proposition 7 establishes that when β > β∗, the TPPS is always a profit maximizing
strategy for the retailer. When the retailer can increase market share by selling open-box
products, it is somewhat intuitive to think that profit will increase as well. However, when
the market share change is negative, it is not quite as clear. In short, Corollaries 1 and 2
along with Proposition 6 indicate that when the market share change is negative, the refund
amount is lower and the open-box price is higher than those when the market share change
is positive. Accordingly, this enables the retailer to compensate for the loss in the market
share, resulting in a higher profit under the TPPS relative to that under the SPPS. I believe
that the model provides theoretical support for Best Buy’s business strategy to sell open-box
products side-by-side with new products in its own primary online and physical stores (Seitz,
2013 (accessed May 30, 2014).
3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I first provide a sensitivity analysis for the majority of the parameters
and decision variables. Later, I present a numerical analysis for the cases in which analytical
insights are not tractable. I show that the sensitivity of decision variables with respect to
model parameters largely depends on the refund sensitivity γ. I also discuss two counterin-
tuitive results. First, I demonstrate that more product returns do not necessarily lead to a
decrease in profit. Second, when the number of open-box products increase due to higher
return rates, retailers can increase open-box product price accordingly.
3.4.4.1 Analytical Sensitivity Analysis
Lemma 1. The change in the optimal decision variables with respect to model parameters
is given in Tables 3.3 through 3.5.
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity analysis-1
SPPS TPPS
Optimal solution Parameter Low γ High γ Low γ High γ γ threshold
r∗
pn + + + +
c - - + - βλ2−β
s + + - + λ[1+βλ(1−α)]1+λ(1−α)(2−β)
α + + - + βλ2−β
p∗o
pn - -
c - + γ˜
s + - λ[2−β+βλ(1−α)]β[1+λ(1−α)]
α + - γ˜
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 show, in each row, the change in optimal solutions for each
product portfolio strategy as a function of an increase in the value of parameters indicated
in the parameter column. For instance, in Table 3.3, an increase in c decreases r∗ when the
retailer sells only new products. However, when the retailer sells both products, an increase
in c increases r∗ if γ is lower than the threshold βλ2−β . If γ >
βλ
2−β , an increase in c decreases
r∗.
Under the SPPS, r∗ decreases with an increase in c and increases with an increase in s
and α. These are expected since s and α reduce the retailer’s cost from returned products
while c increases the cost from them. Accordingly, any increase in s or α (decrease in c)
encourages the retailer to offer a more generous refund amount. Under the TPPS, these
results hold only when refund sensitivity is high. The reason is that open-box demand is low
when γ is high. This implies a low opportunity to reduce the cost of the returns by reselling
them. Consequently, the retailer salvages most of open-box products as she does under the
SPPS. In this case, the corresponding open-box price increases with an increase (a decrease)
in c (s and α) due to the reason explained in Corollary 2. In contrast, when γ is low, the
open-box demand is high, implying that the retailer can reduce the product return cost
more by reselling open-box products than by salvaging them. This encourages the retailer
to increase r∗ accordingly with an increase (a decrease) in c (s and α). Consequently, new
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demand, therefore, available number of open-box products increases. Hence, the retailer
reduces the open-box price to match the supply to demand for for open-box products.
Table 3.4: Sensitivity analysis-2
Optimal solution Parameter γ < γ˜ γ > γ˜
d∗n, Π∗
pn - +
c -
s +
α +
Q∗
pn - +
c -
s +
α -
d∗o
pn + -
c +
s -
α -
The sensitivity results in Table 3.4 hold irrespective of the retailer’s product portfolio
strategy. Any increase in c (decrease in s and α) reduces new demand and increases open-
box demand. This results in an overall decrease in profitability. Moreover, Table 3.4 also
shows that, order quantity Q and new demand dn move in the same direction with respect
to a change in all model parameters, except α. Since the retailer uses closed-box returns
as another source of supply to satisfy the new demand, she can order less new products in
the beginning of the season. Conversely, the retailer’s profit increases (decreases) with an
increase (a decrease) in s and α (c). While the new product price increases the retailer’s
profit when γ > γ˜, I observe exactly the opposite when γ < γ˜. As I discuss in Proposition 2,
increasing new product price increases (decreases) new demand when γ > γ˜ (γ < γ˜). This,
in turn, translates into an increase (decrease) in the retailer’s profit.
Table 3.5 shows the sensitivity of the decision variables with respect to λ and γ under
the SPPS. When λ increases, the retailer decreases the refund amount to reduce the cost of
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Table 3.5: Sensitivity analysis-3 (for the SPPS)
Optimal solution Parameter Sensitivity
r∗, d∗n, Q∗
γ +
λ -
Π∗
γ +
λ
+ when r∗ < αc+ (1− α)s
- when r∗ > αc+ (1− α)s
returns. Consequently, dn and Q decrease. Interestingly, I observe that higher returns do not
necessarily decrease the retailer’s profit. If the optimal refund is less than αc+ (1− α)s, an
increase in λ increases the profit. The intuition is that if a returned product is open-box, the
retailer obtains s by salvaging it. If it is closed-box, she can order one less new product in the
beginning of the season, implying a saving of c. Therefore, αc+ (1− α)s can be considered
as the expected benefit of a returned product. Hence, when the cost of a returned product
is less than its benefit (r∗ < αc + (1− α)s), more returns due to an increase in λ increases
the profit. Finally, when γ increases, I see that the demand shifts from open-box products
to new products. Accordingly, dn and Q increase, resulting in an increase in profit.
3.4.4.2 Numerical Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of decision variables with respect to λ and γ under the TPPS is not
analytically tractable. Instead, I conduct a numerical study over a wide range of model
parameter values that correspond to a full factorial design of experiments that consists of
2,187 cases. The model parameters used in the numerical study are presented in Table 3.6.
I find that in most of the cases, the sensitivity of decision variables with respect to λ
and γ under the TPPS is the same as that derived analytically for the SPPS. Figure 3.4(a)
and Figure 3.5 present two illustrative examples and show the change in decision variables
as a function of γ and λ, respectively. I observe that po decreases in γ. Moreover, when γ is
relatively low, do is insensitive to γ. When γ is moderately high, open-box demand slightly
increases due to the decrease in po. However, if γ is relatively high, customers do not prefer
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Table 3.6: Parameters used in the numerical study
Parameter Values
pn {0.60, 0.75, 0.90}
c {0.20, 0.25, 0.30}
s {0.05, 0.10, 0.15}
λ {0.10, 0.25, 0.40}
γ {0.20, 0.50, 0.80}
α {0.20, 0.50, 0.80}
β {0.40, 0.60, 0.80}
open-box products because returning them is prohibited and thus do is lower.
Interestingly, po increases in λ. From a supply and demand perspective, one would think
that an increase in returns should lead to a decrease in open-box price. However, I observe
the opposite. This arises because when λ increases, the refund amount decreases to reduce
the cost of returns. Consequently, new demand decreases and open-box demand increases.
This encourages the retailer to charge more for open-box products. The retailer is generally
worse off with an increase in λ under the TPPS.
I note that while the findings in Figures 3.4(a) and 3.5 hold for a majority cases, there
are also a few exceptions. Figure 3.4(b) shows an illustrative example of an exceptional
case where the relationship between decision variables and γ is not straightforward and
different. The reason is that the range of γ over which the TPPS is feasible is not continuous,
implying that new demand and open-box demand may alternately increase and decrease
when γ increases. Accordingly, the refund amount and open-box product price have an
unpredictable change with an increase in γ.
3.5 Model Extensions
The results of the previous sections regarding the two different product portfolio strate-
gies are obtained under three main assumptions: (1) demands for both products are deter-
ministic, (2) there is no correlation between the two demands, and (3) in case of an inventory
shortage, customers do not substitute their first choice with the alternative product. In this
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Figure 3.4: The impact of γ on decision variables
section, I relax these assumptions, one at a time, to demonstrate the robustness of the model
and the generality of the insights it provides. I show that retailers can use the TPPS to
mitigate inventory risk due to the uncertainty in both demands. This advantage of the
TPPS is even greater when the random components of both demands are correlated. I also
demonstrate that product substitution leads to a further increase in profitability under the
TPPS.
3.5.1 Stochastic Demand
To assess the impact of demand uncertainty on the decision variables, I extend the deter-
ministic model by adding random variables. I now define the stochastic demand function for
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Figure 3.5: The impact of λ on decision variables
new products as Dn = dn+ where  is a random variable with a probability density function
f(·), a cumulative distribution function F (·), and mean zero. Note that when the retailer
orders Q units, due to closed-box returns, the retailer has Q = Q1−αλ available new products.
Here, Q is different from dn in the deterministic model since new demand is stochastic. For
tractability, I assume that open-box demand has two states, a high demand state and a low
demand state, and each state is realized with a given probability. This is the approach used
in the literature to address uncertainty while maintaining tractability for complex models.
Modeling demand in two different periods (Gumus et al., 2013) and modeling two types of
customers who differ in their cost of visiting a store (Coughlan and Soberman, 2005) are
illustrative examples. For simplicity and without loss of generality, let the open-box demand
be Do with a probability of θ or Do with a probability 1 − θ, where (Do + Do)/2 = do,
Do < min{λ(1− α)Dn, λ(1− α)Q}, and Do > max{λ(1− α)Dn, λ(1− α)Q}. The retailer’s
expected profit, where the superscript U denotes uncertainty is given by
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ΠU (po, r,Q) = pnEmin{Dn, Q}︸ ︷︷ ︸
new product sales
− rλEmin{Dn, Q}︸ ︷︷ ︸
returned
(3.4)
+ poEmin{Do, (1− α)λmin{Dn, Q}}︸ ︷︷ ︸
open-box sales
+ s(Q− Emin{Dn, Q})︸ ︷︷ ︸
not sold new
s[(1− α)λEmin{Dn, Q} − Emin{Do, (1− α)λmin{Dn, Q}}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
not sold open-box
−cQ
The first term in equation 3.4 corresponds to the revenue from the sales of new products
and closed-box returns. The second term indicates the refund amount paid to customers
for returned products. The third term corresponds to the revenue from selling open-box
products. The fourth and fifth terms show the revenue from salvaging all unsold new and
open-box products, respectively. The last term is simply the procurement cost. I assume
that any unsatisfied demand is lost. For model simplicity, I assume that a return occurs
before an open-box demand so long as the aggregate open-box demand is less than the
aggregate number of available returns over the entire selling season.
Proposition 8. 1. The retailer’s optimal order quantity (QU∗) and optimal refund amount (rU∗) for the
SPPS under demand uncertainty is given as
QU∗ = Q∗ + (1− αλ)F−1
(
pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)
pn − rλ− s[1− λ(1− α)]
)
rU∗ = r∗ +
E[Dn −QU∗/(1− αλ)]+
2γ
2. For the TPPS under demand uncertainty, the retailer’s optimal order quantity (QU∗) is given as
QU∗ = Q∗ + (1− αλ)F−1
(
pn − rλ− c(1− αλ)
pn − rλ− s+ λ(1− α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]
)
while the optimal refund amount (rU∗) and the optimal open-box product price (pU∗o ) should satisfy the first
order conditions provided in Appendix C.
3. The resulting optimal expected profit is ΠU∗ = ΠU (pU∗o , r
U∗, QU∗).
In Proposition 8, Q∗ and r∗ denote the optimal solutions from the deterministic model
for a given product portfolio strategy. For the optimal order quantities, the expressions in
the inverse of the cumulative distribution function F−1(·) are representative of the critical
fractiles of the newsvendor problem for the two strategies. The fractile consists of both
78
underage cost (i.e. cost the retailer incurs when Dn > Q ) and overage cost (i.e. cost
the retailer incurs when Q > Dn ). The numerators represent the underage costs and the
denominators represent the summation of underage cost and overage cost. Proposition 8
indicates that, as is typical in a newsvendor problem, the optimal order quantity under
uncertainty can be either higher or lower than that without uncertainty, depending on the
underage and overage costs. Moreover, to hedge against the risk of demand uncertainty, the
retailer offers a higher refund amount under the SPPS than in the deterministic case.
Figure 3.6: The impact of demand uncertainty
I conduct a numerical study by using the parameter values provided in Table 3.6. Two
subfigures in Figure 3.6 show the change in profit as a function of demand variability for
new demand and open-box demand, respectively. Note that the variability in open-box
demand increases with an increase in θ. As expected, an increase in the variability in both
demands reduces the profit. Note that the profit loss is less for the TPPS than for the
SPPS (Figure 3.6(a)). The reason is that new demand under the TPPS is less than that
under the SPPS. Consequently, underage and overage costs, which increase with an increase
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in uncertainty, are lower under the TPPS than those under the SPPS. This confirms that
the TPPS mitigates inventory risk, implying that retailers facing highly uncertain demand
are likely to benefit the most from the TPPS. Further, I observe that although profitability
also decreases with respect to an increase in uncertainty in open-box demand, the decrease
is trivial since open-box demand relative to new demand is low. Figure 3.6(b) shows an
illustrative example for this case.
3.5.2 Correlated Errors
In section 3.5.1, I assume that the random components of both demands are not corre-
lated. Due to the model structure, the deterministic components of both demands are im-
plicitly correlated through prices and refund amount. Therefore, I can expect that random
components may be either positively or negatively correlated as well. Using the parameters
in Table 3.6, I conduct a numerical study to assess the impact of correlated errors of both
demands on retailer’s profit. Here, I assume that the stochastic demand function for open-
box products is Do = do + o, where o is a random variable with mean zero. Moreover, let
ρ denote the correlation between n and o.
Since the number of available open-box products is a linear function of new demand,
it is reasonable to assume that the relationship between random components is also linear.
Therefore, I use a bivariate normal distribution in the numerical study. Here n and o are
random variables from a bivariate normal distribution with means zero, standard deviations
σn and σo, and correlation ρ.
Figure 3.7 shows the impact of correlation between n and o on retailer’s profitabil-
ity under the TPPS. I observe that any increase in the magnitude of correlation between
errors, regardless of its sign, increases retailer’s profit. This arises because correlation re-
duces uncertainty in both demands and a decrease in uncertainty leads to an increase in
profitability.
Moreover, the profit with a positive correlation is higher than that with a negative
correlation when the magnitudes of positive and negative correlations are the same. Since
the number of open-box products is a fraction of new demand, positively correlated errors
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Figure 3.7: The impact of correlation between two demands
result in positively correlated supply and demand for open-box products. This implies low
underage and overage costs for open-box demand. In contrast, when errors are negatively
correlated, open-box demand will not match to the number of open-box returns. In this case,
depending on new demand, the retailer will either have unsold open-box products or not
enough open-box products to satisfy the demand. This implies high underage and overage
costs. However, the retailer is still better-off with negative correlation than no correlation
because the benefit from reduced uncertainty is greater than the cost of a mismatch in supply
and demand.
3.5.3 Product Substitution
So far, I have assumed that, under the TPPS customers only buy their first choice and
leave without a purchase in case their first choice is not available. However, in practice when
their first choice is not available, some customers may prefer to buy the alternative product
as long as they have a positive utility for it. This would especially be a concern for the
retailer for cases in which the risk of stockout is high and the leftover inventory is costly
(e.g. a high value of c and a low value of s). Therefore, in this section I numerically analyze
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the impact of substitution on retailer’s profit.
Recall that the TPPS is a consideration when vno > vn > vo. In this case, all customers
who prefer a new product (i.e. 1 − vno = dn) also have a positive utility for an open-box
product. However, only a fraction β of customers who prefer an open-box product have a
positive utility for a new product (i.e. vno − vn = βdo). I assume that the probability of
substitution between the two products in case the first choice is not available is µ, where
0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. The implicit assumption here is that not all customers necessarily prefer to buy
their alternative product in case the first choice is not available. Some of them may go to
another retailer to find their first choice.
Under product substitution, the expected number of customers who will substitute a new
product with an open-box product is dn→o = min{µE[Dn −Q]+, E[λ(1− α) min{Dn, Q} −
Do]
+}. Similarly, the expected number of customers who will switch to a new product in case
the shortage of open-box products is do→n = min{µβE[Do− λ(1−α) min{Dn, Q}]+, E[Q−
Dn]
+}. Therefore, the retailer’s profit with substitution becomes ΠS = ΠU + [pn − s −
(r − s)λ]do→n + (po − s)dn→o. For convenience, I assume all returns from do→n are simply
salvaged. Considering that number of closed-box returns from do→n will be very small, the
impact of the assumption of salvaging them on the results is insignificant and it does not
change the insights into the problem.
Figure 3.8 shows the impact of product substitution on the retailer’s profitability with
respect to an increase in new demand uncertainty. New demand uncertainty captures dif-
ferent levels of stockout risk. Note that parameters are selected to illustrate a high cost
scenario for leftover inventory. I observe that product substitution mitigates the risk of both
overage and underage, resulting in an increase in retailer’s profit. Moreover, retailers facing
highly demand uncertainty are likely to benefit the most from product substitution under
the TPPS. I note that the impact of product substitution on profitability is very low even
for a case in which product substitution would be a concern for the retailer. This provides
support for the robustness of the model.
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Figure 3.8: The impact of product substitution
3.6 Conclusion
Retailers have developed multiple strategies to effectively manage consumer returns. One
of these strategies is to sell returns as open-box products side-by-side with new products at
a lower price than the new product price. I observe that many major consumer electronics
retailers including Best Buy, Dell, and Amazon.com. follow this strategy, albeit only for
certain product categories. Indeed, some other retailers do not even consider this strategy
largely due to concerns regarding potential cannibalization of demand for new products.
In this essay, I focus on the retail strategy of selling returns internally and compare it
to the strategy of salvaging them. To understand under what conditions retailers prefer one
strategy to the other, I develop an analytical model for a retailer that sells a single product
under a partial return policy. From a modeling perspective, the contribution of this paper to
the literature is three-fold. First, I address the strategy of reselling returns during the selling
season when there is imperfect substitution between new and returned products. Second,
I distinguish product returns based on their condition (i.e. closed-box vs. open-box) and
consider a different reselling option for each condition. Finally, the model captures consumer
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behavior of assessing a retailer’s return policy before making a purchase decision. The last
contribution is specifically important as it leads to very interesting insights for managers. I
summarize the key findings and provide a future research direction in the following section.
3.6.1 Managerial Insights and Future Research
The major finding is good news for retailers: the strategy of selling returns as open-box
products is always more profitable than the strategy of salvaging them as long as there
are some customers in the market who find open-box products more attractive than new
products. I observe that this result holds even though open-box products cannibalize demand
for new products. There are two explanations for the rationale behind this result that depend
on the importance of a retailer’s return policy on customer’s purchase decision. First, when
the return policy is not the main determinant for customer’s purchase decision, retailers
may actually increase their market share by selling returns as open-box. Second, if retailer’s
return policy is the main determinant for customer’s purchase decision, retailers may lose
their market share by selling returns as open-box. However, in this case, the refund amount
given for product returns is low and the price for open-box products is high compared to the
first case. Therefore, regardless of customer’s sensitivity to the return policy, in both cases,
retailers can overcome the negative effect of cannibalization. This finding supports Best
Buy’s business strategy of moving all of its open-box products from the secondary market
to its main channel as part of its Renew Blue strategy.
A second finding is that, as Nordstrom does, retailers can use a generous return policy
to increase demand for new products while charging premium prices. I find that this result
holds when customer sensitivity to the retailer’s return policy is high. The intuition is that
a high price for new products enables retailers to offer a generous return policy through
increasing the refund amount. Moreover, demand for new products depends on both price
and refund amount. Therefore, when retailer’s return policy is the primary determinant for
demand, the retailer may attract more customers with a high refund amount than they lose
due to a high price.
Next, I find that higher return rates do not necessarily lead to a decrease in profit. The
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reason is that a returned product has a value to retailers depending on its condition. If it is
a closed-box return, retailers can order one less new product in the beginning of the season
since they can sell it as new. This saves them the procurement cost. If it is an open-box
return, depending on the strategy they follow, retailers can obtain either a salvage value by
salvaging it or a higher margin than the salvage value by selling it as open-box. Overall, if
the expected value of a returned product is greater than its cost, which is the refund amount
given for it, retailers can actually benefit from higher return rates.
Finally, when product returns increase and consequently the supply for open-box prod-
ucts increases, I establish that retailers do not necessarily need to decrease the price to sell
all open-box products. If the refund amount is greater than the potential benefit of a re-
turned product, more returns hurt retailer’s profit. A natural mechanism to prevent returns
is to restrict return policies by reducing the refund amount. This shifts some of demand
from new products to open-box products. Hence, retailers increase the price for open-box
products to match demand with supply.
I consider only two strategies for the disposition of consumer returns. Future research
may explore other strategies such as sending returns back to manufacturers or selling them
in discount outlet stores. Further, the analysis is based on the monopolistic assumption. I
do not study how competition from another retailer may change the strategy. The analysis
of manufacturer’s incentives to encourage the retailer to sell returns as open-box also has
potential for future work.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Given that returns in U.S. retailing account for almost 9% of total sales (NRF, 2014),
processing returns is now a daily routine for retailers. Practitioners and researchers com-
monly consider consumer returns a cost center for retailers. Consequently, they mainly focus
on preventing returns and minimizing their cost. There are certainly acceptable reasons to
consider returns a cost center. Yet, I believe that such a perspective is too limiting since re-
turns also represent an opportunity that can pay dividends beyond their cost when managed
effectively.
From a holistic perspective, an effective returns management should (1) start with the
in-store shopping experience during a purchase, (2) continue with monitoring and influ-
encing customer satisfaction during a return process, and (3) consider the most effective
and efficient disposition methods for returned products after the return process. Drawing
upon this holistic approach, my dissertation sheds lights on several issues in effective returns
management and provides managerial insights while filling some of the existing gaps in the
literature on consumer returns. In particular, this dissertation comprises two essays in which
I develop econometric and optimization models to (1) assess the impact of delivering high
quality service at the point of purchase on subsequent return behavior, (2) identify the im-
pact of a return event on enhancing customer relationships, and (3) determine the efficiency
of a disposition method in which retailers restock their returns as discounted substitutes for
new products.
In the first essay, I examine the association between in-store customer shopping expe-
rience during a purchase and subsequent return and repurchase behavior. Using over 21
million purchase and return transactions and nearly 75,000 customer satisfaction survey re-
sponses from a national jewelry retailer, I conduct a detailed analysis that incorporates a
sample selection model with simultaneous recursive equations. The unique and rich data set
allows me to tie customer perceptions about a purchase experience to the actual return and
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repurchase behaviors.
In the first part of this essay, I demonstrate that return rates across stores within the
same company can vary significantly. Then, I empirically examine this variation with respect
to product quality, service quality, and customer satisfaction. Overall, I find that retailers
can prevent returns from occurring by influencing customer satisfaction during a purchase
event through ensuring high service quality and product quality. The analysis also reveals
surprising findings for retailers. For instance, I demonstrate that service quality during a
purchase may have a greater influence on returns than product quality. I also show that,
in contrast to the common belief that improving salesperson competence eliminates returns,
a highly competent salesperson may indeed induce a subsequent return potentially. This
can arise if the information the competent salesperson provides unnecessarily increases cus-
tomer’s expectations. Next, I show that a pleasant store environment may also be associated
with increased returns. Again, the likely culprit is unmet expectations. After a purchase,
products do not necessarily look or function the way that they do in store. Finally, when
customers perceive a product’s quality as low, they are more likely to return the product
even if the actual quality may not be low.
From an effective returns management perspective, the first part of the first essay high-
lights that retailers may proactively reduce returns even before they arise by delivering a
high quality shopping experience during a purchase. Considering that the majority of all re-
turns arise due to a mismatch with customer preferences (Douthit et al., 2011), the findings
from this dissertation provide actionable insights for retail managers who seek to prevent
consumer returns. On the sales force management side, retailers may design training mod-
ules to ensure that salespeople not only successfully sell products, but also set reasonable
expectations that actually can be met by the product. On the product side, retailers should
emphasize the quality of their products and expose them to a store’s product selection dur-
ing the sales presentation, Finally, on the store environment side, retailers should organize
the store environment to set reasonable expectations and not to oversell the product.
In the second part of the first essay, I examine how customer satisfaction influences re-
87
purchase behavior separately for returners and non-returners. The findings suggest that a
return event is likely to increase customer repurchase behavior, on average enhancing rev-
enues by $171 per year per customer. However, the impact of a return event depends on a
customer’s satisfaction level during a purchase. For satisfied customers, the event increases
preexisting loyalty. For dissatisfied customers, I find that the average spending of customers
who do not return the products they purchase after an unsatisfactory experience is only
$6. This implies that dissatisfied customers who do not return their initial purchases are
essentially lost. Yet, I demonstrate that when dissatisfied customers return their products,
the average spending goes up to $154. From this perspective, returns from these customers
should be encouraged, not prevented. Hence, returns provide an opportunity for retailer to
enhance customer relationships that will pay dividends beyond the cost of returns. Accord-
ingly, retailers should actively track customer satisfaction, persuade dissatisfied customers
to return their initial purchases, and deliver the same quality level of experience during a
return as during a purchase.
Theoretically, the second part of the first essay has two contributions to the academic
literature. First, many studies report a positive relationship between customer satisfaction
and repurchase behavior (e.g. Cooil et al. (2007); Oliver (2009)). However, some studies
empirically show that improvements in customer satisfaction do not always result in higher
future purchases (e.g. Van Doorn and Verhoef (2008); Voss et al. (2010)). I contribute to this
literature by introducing a return event as another factor that moderates the link between
satisfaction and repurchase behavior. Second, the literature on consumer returns examine
the impact of returns on loyalty and repurchase behavior for online retailers (Mollenkopf
et al., 2007a; Griffis et al., 2012) without considering customer satisfaction with the initial
purchase. I contribute to this stream of the literature by explaining how repurchase behavior
in physical stores varies with satisfaction for customers who later experience a return relative
to those who do not return at all.
In the second essay, I focus on the common retail strategy of selling returns side-by-side
with their new products at a discounted price and compare it to the strategy of salvaging
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them. The model captures important market characteristics that include consumer choice
between new and open-box products, uncertainty and heterogeneity in consumer valuation
for both products, and customer sensitivity to a retailer’s return policy. The operational
decisions of interest are the price of open-box products, the restocking fee for returns, and
the order quantity for new product.
I find that, when at least some customers in the market prefer open-box products to
new products, selling returns as open-box is always a more profitable strategy than simply
salvaging them. This arises even though open-box products cannibalize demand for new
products. Furthermore, retailers may increase their overall market share by selling returns
as open-box if customers are insensitive to a retailer’s return policy. If customers are indeed
sensitive, retailers should use a generous policy to increase demand for new products and
charge premium prices. I also demonstrate that higher return rates do not necessarily lead to
a decrease in profit. Moreover, when product returns increase and consequently the supply
for open-box products increases, I establish that retailers do not necessarily need to decrease
the price to sell all open-box products.
From an effective returns management perspective, the second essay highlights the im-
portance of return disposition to a retailer’s profitability. Retailers typically have concerns
about new product cannibalization due to reselling returned products. The second essay
establishes that such concerns are generally unwarranted. The findings support many strate-
gies I observe in the marketplace including Best Buy’s business strategy of moving all of its
open-box products from the secondary market to its main channel and Nordstrom’s strat-
egy of using a generous return policy to increase demand for new products while charging
premium prices.
From a modeling perspective, the second essay has three contributions to the literature.
First, I address the strategy of reselling returns during the selling season when there is
imperfect substitution between new and returned products. Second, I distinguish product
returns based on their condition (i.e. closed-box vs. open-box) and consider a different re-
selling option for each condition. Finally, the model captures consumer behavior of assessing
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a retailer’s return policy before making a purchase decision.
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APPENDIX A
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY ITEMS
Product Quality
(PQ1) Please rate your satisfaction with the overall quality of jewelry/watches at
{BrandName}.
(PQ2) Please rate your satisfaction with the quality of the jewelry/watch you received
for the price you paid.
(PQ3) Please rate your satisfaction with the selection of jewelry/watches to meet
your needs.
Salesperson Competence
(SC1) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following: The sales-
person had significant knowledge of the products they showed me.
(SC2) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following: The sales-
person was a jewelry/diamond expert.
(SC3) Please rate your satisfaction with the salesperson showing you additional items
to compliment the primary item you were interested in.
Salesperson Helpfulness
(SH1) Please rate your satisfaction with the friendliness of your salesperson.
(SH2) Please rate your satisfaction with the availability of assistance.
(SH3) Please rate your satisfaction with the manner in which you were greeted upon
entering the store.
Store Environment
(SE1) Please rate your satisfaction with the overall store environment.
(SE2) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following: This
{BrandName} store has a comfortable environment for me to buy jewelry.
(SE3) Please rate your satisfaction with the length of time it took to checkout.
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Customer Satisfaction
(CS1) Please rate your overall satisfaction with your experience at this
{BrandName}.
(CS2) Based on this visit, what is the likelihood that you will return to this
{BrandName} for your next jewelry/watch purchase.
(CS3) Based on this visit, what is the likelihood that you will recommend this
{BrandName} to others.
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APPENDIX B
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY
Diamond uses Internet-based surveys. While Internet-based survey research has several
advantages, careless or inattentive responses are a concern, specifically for data quality.
Accordingly, several methods have been suggested to identify careless respondents to increase
data quality (Meade and Craig, 2012). Following Meade and Craig (2012), I use the response
time (completion time) for each survey response to identify careless responses. The entire
survey consists of 48 questions. Descriptive statistics reveal that the average survey response
time is 10 minutes and 95% of response times fall in the range of 4-25 minutes. Therefore,
I remove survey responses that are completed within less than 4 minutes and more than 25
minutes. This results in 73,598 usable survey responses.
I performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Mplus 7 to check how the the-
oretical model fits the data. Table B.1 presents the CFA results. As seen from the table,
the fit statistics for the overall measurement model show acceptable fit (RMSEA=0.057,
CFI=0.978, TLI=0.969, SRMR=0.025). Note that for models with large sample sizes, the
χ2 is inflated and always statistically significant (Bentler and Bonnet, 1980; Joreskog and
Long, 1993). Therefore, it is not interpretable for model fit for the dataset. However, I use
a random sample of 400 survey responses to get an interpretable χ2 test to assess the model
fit for a small sample. The χ2 (χ2/df) for the sample data is 139.7 (2.91), indicating a good
fit. I also note that the fit indices and factor loadings for the sample data (not shown) are
very similar to the fit indices for the entire data.
Following this step, I assess the composite reliabilities as outlined by Fornell and Larcker
(1981). The composite reliabilities for all latent variables are greater than the recommended
cutoff value of 0.7. In addition, all average variance extracted scores are greater than 0.5, es-
tablishing an adequate reliability. I employ Cronbach’s alpha to assess scale reliability. Scale
reliabilities for all constructs are above 0.7. I assess convergent validity of latent variables
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Table B.1: Confirmatory factor analysis results for survey scale development
Latent Variable Indicator Standardized Loading t-values Cronbach’s α
PRODQUAL
CR=0.837
AVE=0.646
PQ1 0.840 519.53 0.834
PQ2 0.792 421.93
PQ1 0.778 397.41
COMPETENCE
CR=0.808
AVE=0.618
SC1 0.855 533.28 0.817
SC2 0.766 375.79
SC3 0.732 326.70
HELPFULNESS
CR=0.885
AVE=0.699
SH1 0.802 511.20 0.809
SH2 0.836 598.88
SH3 0.868 656.61
ENVIRONMENT
CR=0.808
AVE=0.618
SE1 0.828 574.47 0.819
SE2 0.790 487.07
SE3 0.737 396.64
SATISFACTION
CR=0.821
AVE=0.634
CS1 0.582 215.05 0.818
CS2 0.847 422.82
CS3 0.920 474.30
- Sample size (n)=73,598. All loadings are significant at p < 0.001
- Goodness-of-Fit Indices: RMSEA=0.057, CFI=0.978, TLI=0.969, SRMR=0.025
- CR: Construct reliability, AVE: Average variance extracted
- RMSEA: Root mean square error of approximation, CFI: Confirmatory fit index
- TLI: Tucker-Lewis index, SRMR: Standardized root mean residual
by examining the standardized path coefficients from the latent structures to their corre-
sponding manifest indicators (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). All the path coefficients are
greater than 0.40 (p < 0.001) and are more than 10 times their standard errors. I assess the
discriminant validity between latent variables through the analysis of two-factor CFA model
(Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). For each pair of latent constructs, I estimate two models - one con-
straining the correlation between the pair to unity and one freely estimating the correlation.
I use a χ2-test to assess if the ∆χ2 is significantly lower for the unconstrained models as
compared to the constrained model. The ∆χ2 exceeds the critical value (∆χ2∆df=1 > 3.84)
for all pairs, establishing discriminant validity. In conclusion, the measures are reliable,
valid, and support the theoretical model.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS OF TECHNICAL RESULTS
Proof of Proposition 1:
max Π(po, r,Q) = pndn︸ ︷︷ ︸
new product sales
− rλdn︸ ︷︷ ︸
returned
+ po min{do, (1− α)λdn}︸ ︷︷ ︸
open-box sales
+ s[(1− α)λdn − do]+︸ ︷︷ ︸
not sold open-box
−cQ
Case 1: Sell only new products (dn > 0, do = 0)
Here, dn = 1 − pn + γr, do = 0, and Q = (1 − αλ)(1 − pn + γr). The retailer salvages
all open-box products. In this case, the profit function becomes Π(r) = [pn − rλ + sλ(1 −
α)− c(1− αλ)](1− pn + γr). The second derivative of Π(r) w.r.t. r is −2λγ < 0, implying
that the profit function is concave. Since the profit function is concave, necessary conditions
and sufficient conditions for optimality are that FOC= 0. This leads to the optimal refund
amount:
r∗ =
(λ+ γ)pn − γ[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]− λ
2λγ
For do = 0, I should have po = β(pn − γr). Plugging r∗ into this expression gives the
optimal open-box price when the retailer sells only new.
p∗o =
β[(λ− γ)pn + γ[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)] + λ]
2λ
Case 2: Sell both new and open-box products (dn > 0, do > 0)
Here, dn = 1 − pn−po−γr1−β , do = βpn−po−βγrβ(1−β) , and Q = (1 − αλ)(1 − pn−po−γr1−β ). If do ≥
(1 − α)λdn, there is no open-box product to salvage. Otherwise, the retailer salvages all
unsold open-box products [(1− α)λdn − do].
When do < (1 − α)λdn, the Hessian is
 −2λγ1−β −(λ+γ)1−β−(λ+γ)
1−β
−2
β(1−β)
, whose principal minors
(−2λγ1−β ,
−2
β(1−β)) are negative and whose determinant
4λγ−β(λ+γ)2
β(1−β)2 is positive when β < β˜ =
4λγ
(λ+γ)2
, implying that the profit function is concave. Setting FOC= 0 gives the following
expressions for the optimal open-box price and the optimal refund:
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p∗o =
λβ(1− β)(λ+ γ)− βpn(λ− γ)2 + sγ[2λ− β(λ+ γ)]− βγ(λ− γ)[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]
4λγ − β(λ+ γ)2
r∗ =
2(λ+ γ)(1− β)pn − 2λ(1− β) + s(γ − λ)− [2γ − β(λ+ γ)][c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]
4λγ − β(λ+ γ)2
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove this proposition, I need to find the expression for the new demand dn and take
the derivative w.r.t. pn. When I plug r
∗ and p∗o into equation 3.1, I find that the optimal
new demand is
d∗n =

γ[2pn(γ−λ)+s(λ+γ)+[2λ−β(λ+γ)]−2γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]]
4λγ−β(λ+γ)2 if β < β < β
pn(γ−λ)+λ−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]
2λ otherwise
∂d∗n
∂pn
=

2γ(γ−λ)
4λγ−β(λ+γ)2 if β < β < β
(γ−λ)
2λ otherwise
As seen in both equations, derivatives are positive when γ > λ, implying that new
demand increases as pn increases. When γ < λ, derivatives are negative and therefore new
demand decreases in pn. Here, I assume γ˜ = λ.
Proof of Proposition 3:
pn − γr∗ > p
∗
o
β requires βpn(λ + γ)(λ − γ) + λβ(γ − λ) − 2λγs + γβ(λ + γ)[c(1 − αλ) −
sλ(1− α)] > 0 or provides a lower bound for β:
β∗ =
2λγs
pn(λ2 − γ2) + λ(γ − λ) + γ(λ+ γ)[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]
That is, I have pn − γr∗ > p
∗
o
β , and therefore do > 0 when β > β
∗.
Similarly, when p∗o = pn − γr∗ − (1− β), the new demand is zero (dn = 0). Plugging r∗
and p∗o into this expression gives the following expression as the upper bound for β under
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which I derive the analytical results:
β =
2pn(γ − λ) + 2λ+ s(λ+ γ)− 2γ[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]
λ+ γ
.
Proof of Proposition 4:
To prove this proposition, I need to take the derivative of β∗ w.r.t. pn.
∂β∗
∂pn
=
2sλγ(λ+ γ)(γ − λ)
[pn(γ − λ)(γ + λ) + λ(λ− γ)− γ(γ + λ)[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]]2
As seen from the equation, the derivative is positive when γ > λ, implying that β∗
increases as pn increases. When γ < λ, the derivative is negative and therefore β
∗ decreases
in pn.
If I set β∗ = β˜ and find an equation for pn (i.e. pˆn), I can find the value of the new price
at which β∗ converges to β˜.
pˆn =
2λ(γ − λ)− s(γ + λ)2 + 2γ(γ + λ)[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]
2(γ2 − λ2)
Proof of Proposition 5:
To prove this proposition, I simply find the values for pn that makes r
∗ equal to pn and
s respectively.
r∗ =

2(λ+γ)(1−β)pn−2λ(1−β)+s(γ−λ)−[2γ−β(λ+γ)][c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]
4λγ−β(λ+γ)2 if β < β < β
(λ+γ)pn−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−λ
2λγ otherwise
If r∗ = pn, then I find the following expression for pn.
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pn =

2λ(1−β)−s(γ−λ)+[2γ−β(λ+γ)][c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]
2(1−β)(λ+γ)−[4λγ−β(λ+γ)2] if β < β < β
λ+γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]
λ+γ−2λγ otherwise
If r∗ = s, then I find the following expression for pn.
pn =

2λ(1−β)−s[γ−λ+β(γ2+αλ2)]−βλc(1−αλ)+(2γ−βγ)[c(1−αλ)+sλ(1+α)]
2(λ+γ)(1−β) if β < β < β
λ+γ[c(1−αλ)+sλ(1+α)]
λ+γ otherwise
Since ∂r
∗
pn
is always positive, r∗ is an increasing function in pn. Therefore, the boundary
values for pn are consistent such that pn > pn.
Proof of Corollary 1:
The difference Θ between the optimal refund when the retailer sells both products and
the optimal refund when she sells only new is equal to
Θ = (γ−λ)[βpn(γ−λ)(γ+λ)−βγ(γ+λ)[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−βλ(γ−λ)+2λγs]
2λγ[4λγ−β(λ+γ)2]
Using d∗o from equation 3.2, it is easy to show that Θ = −β(γ−λ)d
∗
o
2λγ . Since d
∗
o > 0 when the
retailer sells both products, Θ, therefore the change in the refund amount when the retailer
starts selling open-box products, is negative when γ > λ = γ˜ and positive when γ < λ = γ˜.
Proof of Proposition 6:
I denote the increase in market size when offering both products as ∆. The increase
in market size is simply the difference between the total sales when the retailer sells both
products and the total sales when she sells only new products. Hence,
∆ = d∗n−sellboth + d
∗
o−sellboth − d∗n−sellonlynew
∆ = [β(γ+λ)−2λ][βpn(γ−λ)(γ+λ)−βγ(γ+λ)[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−βλ(γ−λ)+2λγs]
2λβ[4λγ−β(λ+γ)2]
Using the optimal d∗o when the retailer sells both products, I can simplify ∆ as
∆ = [2λ−β(γ+λ)]d
∗
o
2λ
This implies that when 2λ− β(γ + λ) > 0, or when γ < (2−β)λβ , ∆ is positive . Similarly,
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when γ > (2−β)λβ , ∆ becomes negative, implying a decrease in the market size.
Proof of Corollary 2:
The difference Λ between the optimal open-box price when the retailer sells both products
and the optimal open-box price when she sells only new is equal to
Λ = [2λ−β(γ+λ)][βpn(γ−λ)(γ+λ)−βγ(γ+λ)[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−βλ(γ−λ)+2λγs]
2λ[4λγ−β(λ+γ)2]
When I plug r∗ and p∗o in to do in equation 3.2, I find the optimal open-box demand
when the retailer sells both products.
d∗o =
βγ(γ+λ)[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−βpn(γ−λ)(γ+λ)+βλ(γ−λ)−2λγs
β[4λγ−β(λ+γ)2]
Using d∗o I can show that Λ = −β[2λ−β(γ+λ)]d
∗
o
2λ . Since d
∗
o > 0 when the retailer sells both
products, Λ, therefore the change in the open-box product price when the retailer starts
selling open-box products, is positive when 2λ − β(γ + λ) < 0, or when γ > (2−β)λβ = γˆ.
Similarly, when γ < (2−β)λβ = γˆ, the open-box product price decreases when the retailer
starts selling both products. This implies that po when γ <
(2−β)λ
β = γˆ is less than po when
γ > (2−β)λβ = γˆ.
Proof of Proposition 7:
To find the impact of selling open-box returns on profitability, I compare the profit when
the retailer sells both products to the profit when she sells only new products. The change
in the profit is equal to
Πsellboth −Πsellonlynew = [βpn(γ−λ)(γ+λ)−βγ(γ+λ)[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−βλ(γ−λ)+2λγs]
2
4λγβ[4λγ−β(λ+γ)2]
Using the optimal d∗o when the retailer sells both products, I can simplify this expression
to
Πsellboth −Πsellonlynew = (d
∗
o)
2β[4λγ−β(λ+γ)2]
4λγ
Clearly, this expression is strictly positive since 4λγ − β(λ+ γ)2 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1:
• Optimal open-box price (p∗o):
When the retailer sells both products;
∂p∗o
∂pn
= − β(γ−λ)2
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 < 0
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∂p∗o
∂c =
βγ(γ−λ)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ > λ and negative when γ < λ.
∂p∗o
∂s =
γ[βλ(1−α)(λ−γ)+2γ−β(γ+λ)]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ <
λ[2−β+βλ(1−α)]
β[1+λ(1−α)] and negative when
γ > λ[2−β+βλ(1−α)]β[1+λ(1−α)] .
∂p∗o
∂α =
βλγ(λ−γ)(c−s)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ < λ and negative when γ > λ.
When the retailer sells only new products;
∂p∗o
∂pn
= β(λ−γ)2λ is negative when γ > λ and positive when γ < λ
∂p∗o
∂c =
βγ(1−αλ)
2λ > 0
∂p∗o
∂s = −βγ(1−α)2 < 0
∂p∗o
∂α = −βγ(c−s)2 < 0
∂p∗o
∂γ = −β[pn−c+sλ+(c−s)αλ]2λ < 0
∂p∗o
∂λ =
βγ(pn−c)
2λ2
> 0
• Optimal refund amount (r∗):
When the retailer sells both products;
∂r∗
∂pn
= 2(1−β)(γ+λ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 > 0
∂r∗
∂c = − (1−αλ)[2γ−β(γ+λ)]4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ < βλ2−β and negative when γ > βλ2−β
∂r∗
∂s =
(γ−λ)+λ(1−αλ)[2γ−β(γ+λ)]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ >
λ[1+βλ(1−α)]
1+λ(1−α)(2−β) and negative when
γ < λ[1+βλ(1−α)]1+λ(1−α)(2−β)
∂r∗
∂α =
λ(c−s)[2γ−β(γ+λ)]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ >
βλ
2−β and negative when γ <
βλ
2−β
When the retailer sells only new products;
∂r∗
∂pn
= γ+λ2λγ > 0
∂r∗
∂c = − (1−αλ)2λ < 0
∂r∗
∂s =
1−α
2 > 0
∂r∗
∂α =
c−s
2 > 0
∂r∗
∂γ =
1−pn
2γ2
> 0
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∂r∗
∂λ =
c−pn
2λ2
< 0
• Optimal new demand (d∗n):
When the retailer sells both products;
∂d∗n
∂pn
= 2γ(γ−λ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ > λ and negative when γ < λ.
∂d∗n
∂c = − 2γ
2(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 < 0
∂d∗n
∂s =
γ[γ+λ+2λγ(1−α)]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 > 0
∂d∗n
∂α =
2λγ2(c−s)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 > 0
When the retailer sells only new products;
∂d∗n
∂pn
= γ−λ2λ is negative when γ < λ and positive when γ > λ.
∂d∗n
∂c = −γ(1−αλ)2λ < 0
∂d∗n
∂s =
γ(1−α)
2 > 0
∂d∗n
∂α =
γ(c−s)
2 > 0
∂d∗n
∂γ =
pn−c+sλ+(c−s)αλ
2λ > 0
∂d∗n
∂λ =
γ(c−pn)
2λ2
< 0
• Optimal order quantity (Q∗):
When the retailer sells both products;
∂Q∗
∂pn
= 2γ(γ−λ)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ > λ and negative when γ < λ.
∂Q∗
∂c = − 2γ
2(1−αλ)2
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 < 0
∂Q∗
∂s =
γ(1−αλ)[γ+λ+2λγ(1−α)]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 > 0
∂Q∗
∂α =
λγ[γ(4c−2pn−3s+β)−λ(2−2pn+s+β+2sγ+4cαγ−4sαγ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 = −λd∗n + 2λγ
2(c−s)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 if I use
the expression for the optimal new demand when the retailer sells both products. This
implies that when d∗n >
2γ2(c−s)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 , optimal order quantity decreases in α. Since
d∗n =
γ2(2pn−2c+s−β)+γλ[2−2pn−β+2cαγ+s+2γs(1−α)]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 =
γ2(2pn−s−β)+γλ(2−2pn−β+s+2γs)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 +
2γ2(c−s)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 >
2γ2(c−s)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 and
γ2(2pn−s−β)+γλ(2−2pn−β+s+2γs)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 > 0, I can prove
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that d∗n >
2γ2(c−s)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 always holds, therefore, optimal order quantity decreases in
α.
When the retailer sells only new products;
∂Q∗
∂pn
= (γ−λ)(1−αλ)2λ is negative when γ < λ and positive when γ > λ.
∂Q∗
∂c = −γ(1−αλ)
2
2λ < 0
∂Q∗
∂s =
γ(1−α)(1−αλ)
2 > 0
∂Q∗
∂α = −γ(pn−2c+s)−λ[pn−1−2cαγ−sγ(1−2α)]2 = −λd∗n + γ(c−s)(1−αλ)2 if I use the expres-
sion for the optimal new demand when the retailer sells only new product. This
implies that when d∗n >
γ(c−s)(1−αλ)
2λ , optimal order quantity decreases in α. Since
d∗n =
γpn+λ−λ[pn−sγ(1−α)]−cγ(1−αλ)
2λ =
(pn−γs)(1−λ)+λ
2λ +
γ(c−s)(1−αλ)
2λ >
γ(c−s)(1−αλ)
2λ and
(pn−γs)(1−λ)+λ
2λ > 0, I can prove that d
∗
n >
γ(c−s)(1−αλ)
2λ always holds, therefore, optimal
order quantity decreases in α.
∂Q∗
∂γ =
(1−αλ)[pn−c+sλ(1−α)+cαλ]
2λ > 0
∂Q∗
∂λ = −γ(pn−c)+αλ
2[1−pn+sγ+αγ(c−s)]
2λ2
< 0
• Optimal open-box demand (d∗o):
When the retailer sells both products;
∂d∗o
∂pn
= (λ−γ)(γ+λ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 is positive when γ < λ and negative when γ > λ.
∂d∗o
∂c =
γ(γ+λ)(1−αλ)
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 > 0
∂d∗o
∂s = −γλ[2+β(λ+γ)(1−α)]β[4λγ−β(γ+λ)2] < 0
∂d∗o
∂α = −λγ(λ+γ)(c−s)4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 < 0
• Optimal profit (Π∗):
When the retailer sells both products;
∂Π∗
∂pn
= (λ−γ)[γ(2c−2pn−s+β)+λ[−2+2pn+β−2cαγ−s[1+2γ(1−α)]]]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 . Using the expression for Q
∗
when the retailer sells both products, I can show that ∂Π
∗
∂pn
= (γ−λ)Q
∗
γ(1−αλ) . Therefore,
∂Π∗
∂pn
is positive when γ > λ and negative when γ < λ.
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∂Π∗
∂c =
γ(1−αλ)[γ(2c−2pn−s+β)+λ[−2+2pn+β−2cαγ−s[1+2γ(1−α)]]]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 . Using the expression for
Q∗ when the retailer sells both products, I can show that ∂Π
∗
∂c = −Q∗. Therefore, ∂Π
∗
∂c
is negative.
∂Π∗
∂s is trivial. However, using the expression for Q
∗ when the retailer sells both prod-
ucts, I can show that ∂Π
∗
∂s = λ(1−α)d∗n− d∗o. This is positive for the provided solution
based on the domain Ω. Therefore, ∂Π
∗
∂s is positive.
∂Π∗
∂α =
(c−s)γλ[γ(−2c+2pn+s−β)−λ[−2+2pn+β−2cαγ−s[1+2γ(1−α)]]]
4λγ−β(γ+λ)2 . Using the expression for
Q∗ when the retailer sells both products, I can show that ∂Π
∗
∂α =
(λ(c−s)Q∗
(1−αλ) . Therefore,
∂Π∗
∂α is always positive.
When the retailer sells only new products;
∂Π∗
∂pn
= (γ−λ)[pn(γ−λ)+λ−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]]2λγ =
(γ−λ)Q∗
γ(1−αλ) . Using the expression for Q
∗ when
the retailer sells only new product. Therefore, ∂Π
∗
∂pn
is positive when γ > λ and negative
when γ < λ.
∂Π∗
∂c = − (1−αλ)[pn(γ−λ)+λ−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]]2λ = −Q∗. Therefore, ∂Π
∗
∂c is negative.
∂Π∗
∂s =
(1−α)[pn(γ−λ)+λ−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]]
2 =
(1−α)λQ∗
1−αλ . Therefore,
∂Π∗
∂s is positive.
∂Π∗
∂α =
(c−s)[pn(γ−λ)+λ−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]]
2 =
(c−s)λQ∗
1−αλ . Therefore,
∂Π∗
∂α is positive.
∂Π∗
∂γ =
[(λ+γ)pn−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]−λ][pn(γ−λ)+λ−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]]
4λγ2
. Using the expres-
sions for the optimal new demand and optimal refund amount when the retailer sells
only new products, I can show that ∂Π
∗
∂γ =
λr∗d∗n
γ > 0
∂Π∗
∂λ =
[1−pn+sγ(1−α)+cαγ]2
4γ − γ(pn−c)
2
4λ2
. Using the expressions for the optimal new de-
mand and optimal refund amount when the retailer sells only new products, I can show
that ∂Π
∗
∂λ = d
∗
n(s+ α(c− s)− r∗). Therefore, when r∗ > s+ α(c− s), ∂Π
∗
∂λ is negative.
When r∗ < s+ α(c− s), ∂Π∗∂λ is positive.
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Proof of Proposition 8:
Single-product portfolio strategy solution
In this case, the retailer sells only new products. Therefore, dn = 1 − pn + γr and the
resulting expected profit function is
ΠU (r,Q) = pnEmin{Dn, Q}︸ ︷︷ ︸
new product sales
− rλEmin{Dn, Q}︸ ︷︷ ︸
returned
+ sλ(1− α)Emin{Dn, Q}︸ ︷︷ ︸
salvaged open-box returns
+ s[Q−Dn]+︸ ︷︷ ︸
unsold new
−cQ
I can write the profit function as a piecewise function:
ΠU (r,Q) =

[pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)]Dn + s(Q−D)− cQ if Dn ≤ Q
[pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)]Q− cQ if Dn > Q
Following Petruzzi and Dada (1999), let z = Q−dn and  = Dn−dn. Then, when I take
the expectation, the profit function becomes
ΠU (r,Q) =
∫ z
−∞ {[pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)][dn + ] + s(z − )− c(1− αλ)(dn + z)} f()d
+
∫∞
z {[pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)][dn + z]− c(1− αλ)(dn + z)} f()d
Note that
∫ z
−∞(z− )f()d =
∫ Q−dn
−∞ F ()d = E[Q−Dn]+ and can be considered as the
probability of overage since I normalize the market size to 1. Similarly,
∫∞
z ( − z)f()d =∫∞
Q−dn [1− F ()]d = E[Dn −Q]+ and represents the probability of underage.
Finally, note that
∫ z
−∞ f()d +
∫∞
z f()d = E() = 0. Therefore,
∫ z
−∞ f()d =
− ∫∞z f()d. Now I can write the expected profit function as
ΠU (r,Q) = [pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]dn + sE[Q−Dn]+ − [pn − rλ
+sλ(1− α)]E[Dn −Q]+ − c(1− αλ)
∫ z
−∞ zf()d− c(1− αλ)
∫∞
z zf()d
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Since c(1 − αλ) ∫ z−∞ f()d + c(1 − αλ) ∫∞z f()d = c(1 − αλ)E() = 0, adding these
two terms to the profit function will not change the value of it. Therefore, the profit function
becomes
ΠU (r,Q) = [pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]dn − [pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)
−c(1− αλ)]E[Dn −Q]+ − [c(1− αλ)− s]E[Q−Dn]+
or
ΠU (r,Q) = [pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]dn − CuE[Dn −Q]+ − CoE[Q−Dn]+
where Cu = pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ) is the underage cost and Co = c(1− αλ)− s is
the overage cost.
The first step in maximizing the retailer’s profit is to find the optimal Q that maximizes
the profit function for a given r.
∂ΠU (r,Q)
∂Q
= Cu − (Cu + Co)F (Q− dn)
Since the second derivative of profit function [−(Cu +Co)f(Q− dn)] is less than or equal to
0, setting the FOC to 0 gives the optimal order quantity for a given r. Therefore,
Q
U∗
= F−1
[
Cu
Cu + Co
]
+ dn
The resulting optimal order quantity is QU∗ = (1− αλ)
[
F−1
[
Cu
Cu+Co
]
+ dn
]
.
Next, I substitute Q
U∗
into the expected profit function. By doing this, I reduce the
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bivariate objective function into a univariate function of r as follows:
ΠU (r) = [pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]dn − CuE[Dn −QU∗]+ − CoE[QU∗ −Dn]+
= [pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]dn − Cu
∫∞
Q
U∗−dn [1− F ()]d
−Co
∫ QU∗−dn
−∞ F ()d
∂ΠU (r)
∂r
= γ[pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]− λ(1− pn + γr)
−Co · F (QU∗ − dn) · (∂QU∗∂r − γ) + λE[Dn −Q
U∗
]+
+Cu · [1− F (QU∗ − dn)] · (∂QU∗∂r − γ)
= γ[pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]− λ(1− pn + γr) + λE[Dn −QU∗]+
−Co CuCu+Co · (
∂QU∗
∂r − γ) + Cu · [1− CuCu+Co ] · (
∂QU∗
∂r − γ)
= γ[pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1− αλ)]− λ(1− pn + γr) + λE[Dn −QU∗]+
Since the second derivative of profit function (i.e. −2λγ− Coλ[c(1−αλ)−s]
(Cu+Co)f(Q
U∗−dn)[pn−rλ+sλ(1−α)−s]2
)
is negative, setting the FOC to 0 gives the optimal refund amount (rU∗).
rU∗ =
(λ+ γ)pn − γ[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]− λ
2λγ
+
E[Dn −QU∗]+
2γ
(C.1)
Two-product portfolio strategy solution
When the retailer sells both new and open-box products, I have four cases: (Dn ≤ Q and
Do = Do), (Dn ≤ Q and Do = Do), (Dn > Q and Do = Do), and (Dn > Q and Do = Do).
Using the same approach in the previous section, I can rewrite the profit function as:
ΠU (po, r,Q) =

(pn − rλ)Dn − cQ+ poDo + s[Q−Dn + λ(1− α)Dn −Do] if Do = Do and Dn ≤ Q
(pn − rλ)Dn − cQ+ poλ(1− α)Dn + s[Q−Dn] if Do = Do and Dn ≤ Q
(pn − rλ)Q− cQ+ poDo + s[λ(1− α)Q−Do] if Do = Do and Dn > Q
(pn − rλ)Q− cQ+ poλ(1− α)Q if Do = Do and Dn > Q
If I use the same transformation I used in the single-product portfolio strategy solution,
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I can rewrite the profit function as
ΠU (po, r, Q) =
∫ z
−∞{(pn − rλ)(dn + ) + s(z − )− c(1− αλ)(dn + z) + θ[poDo + s[λ(1− α)(dn + )−Do]]
+(1− θ)poλ(1− α)(dn + )}f()d+
∫∞
z {[pn − rλ− c(1− αλ)](dn + z)
+θ[poDo + s[λ(1− α)(dn + z)−Do]] + (1− θ)poλ(1− α)(dn + z)}f()d
When I do the back transformation and write the expected profit as underage and overage
costs, I find that
ΠU (po, r, Q) = [pn − rλ+ λ(1− α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]− c(1− αλ)]dn + θDo(po − s)
−[pn − rλ− c(1− αλ)]E[Dn −Q]+
−[c(1− αλ)− s+ λ(1− α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]]E[Q−Dn]+
or
ΠU (po, r,Q) = [pn − rλ+ λ(1− α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]− c(1− αλ)]dn + θDo(po − s)
−CuE[Dn −Q]+ − CoE[Q−Dn]+
where Cu = pn− rλ− c(1−αλ) is the underage cost and Co = c(1−αλ)− s+λ(1−α)[θs+
(1− θ)po] is the overage cost.
The first step in maximizing the retailer’s profit is to find the optimal Q that maximizes
the profit function for a given r and po.
∂ΠU (po, r,Q)
∂Q
= Cu − (Cu + Co)F (Q− dn)
Since the second derivative of profit function [−(Cu +Co)f(Q− dn)] is less than or equal to
0, setting the FOC to 0 gives the optimal order quantity for a given r. Therefore,
Q
U∗
= F−1
[
Cu
Cu + Co
]
+ dn
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The resulting optimal order quantity is QU∗ = (1− αλ)
[
F−1
[
Cu
Cu+Co
]
+ dn
]
.
Next, I substitute Q
U∗
into the expected profit function.
ΠU (po, r) = [pn − rλ+ λ(1− α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]− c(1− αλ)]dn + θDo(po − s)− CuE[Dn −Q
U∗
]+ − CoE[QU∗ −Dn]+
= [pn − rλ+ λ(1− α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]− c(1− αλ)]dn + θDo(po − s)− Cu
∫∞
Q
U∗−dn [1− F ()]d
−Co
∫QU∗−dn
−∞ F ()d
∂ΠU (po, r)
∂r
=
γ
1− β [pn − rλ+ λ(1−α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]− c(1−αλ)]− λdn + λE[Dn −Q
U∗
]+
When the second derivative of profit function w.r.t. r (i.e. − 2λγ1−β − λCoCu+Co (
∂Q
U∗
∂r − γ1−β ) is
negative, setting the FOC to 0 gives the optimal refund amount (rU∗). Similarly,
∂ΠU (po, r)
∂po
= 1
1−β [pn − rλ− c(1− αλ) + λ(1− α)[θs+ (1− θ)po]] + θDo
+λ(1− α)(1− θ)(dn − E[QU∗/(1− αλ)−Dn]+)
When the second derivative of ΠU (po, r) w.r.t. po (i.e. −2(1−θ)λ(1−α)1−β − (1−θ)λ(1−α)CuCu+Co (
∂Q
U∗
∂po
−
1
1−β ) is negative, setting the FOC to 0 gives the optimal open-box price (p
U∗
o ).
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APPENDIX D
SOLUTION METHOD FOR NONCONCAVE PROFIT FUNCTIONS
The profit function is not concave either when do > (1 − α)λdn or if β ≥ 4λγ(λ+γ)2 when
do ≤ (1 − α)λdn. When do > (1 − α)λdn, the objective function becomes Π(po, r) =
[pn − rλ + poλ(1 − α) − c(1 − αλ)](1 − pn−po−γr1−β ). Since Π(r, po) is not concave, FOC does
not guarantee optimality. However, the second derivative of Π(po, r) w.r.t. r is
−2λγ
1−β < 0,
implying that the profit function is concave in r for any given po. Therefore, setting FOC
to 0 gives the optimal refund amount for a given po.
r∗(po) =
(λ+ γ)pn − λ[1− γ(1− α)]po − λ(1− β)− γc(1− αλ)
2λγ
When do ≤ (1− α)λdn, the objective function is Π(po, r) = [pn − rλ+ sλ(1− α)− c(1−
αλ)](1 − pn−po−γr1−β ) + (po − s)(βpn−po−βγrβ(1−β) ). Since Π(r, po) is not concave when β ≥ 4λγ(λ+γ)2 ,
FOC does not guarantee optimality. However, the second derivative of Π(po, r) w.r.t. r is
−2λγ
1−β < 0, implying that the profit function is concave in r for any given po. Therefore,
setting FOC to 0 gives the optimal refund amount for a given po.
r∗(po) =
(λ+ γ)(pn − po) + sγ − λ(1− β)− γ[c(1− αλ)− sλ(1− α)]
2λγ
Hence, I can write the optimal refund for a given po as a piecewise linear function:
r∗(po) =

(λ+γ)pn−λ[1−γ(1−α)]po−λ(1−β)−γc(1−αλ)
2λγ if do > (1− α)λdn
(λ+γ)(pn−po)+sγ−λ(1−β)−γ[c(1−αλ)−sλ(1−α)]
2λγ if do ≤ (1− α)λdn
By the structure of the model, I have that po > s. Since do > 0, I also have pn−γr > poβ ,
implying that for the minimum values of γ and r, po < βpn. Therefore, a one-dimensional
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numerical search in po using r
∗(po) in the range of po ∈ (s, βpn) will provide the optimal
solutions for the decision variables when they exist. Hence, I can define the optimal solutions
for a non-concave profit function as
p∗o = arg max
po
{
ΠDD(po, r
∗(po), Q)
}
r∗ = r∗(p∗o)
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